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In the middle of the 16th century, Vittoria attempted to determine the international 
legal doctrine on wrongfulness of conducting aggressive war. He wrote that war was 
only justified when “retaliating the wrongful act”1 conducted by someone else. Hugo 
Grotius shared similar opinion2. For him fair and permissible war was only possible in 
response to a violation of law. In other words, in the name of self-defence: “In case of 
an attack on people by open force, which would appear to be unavoidable and carry 
danger to life, a war is permissible allowing even killing of the assaulter”3. However, 
as Ayala argues, not against the “heterodox, just because they appear to be heterodox, 
even by the order of the imperator or the pope”4. In any case, despite of the number of 
wars that took place before 1945, it was only after the Second World War – that had 
estimated deaths of 60 million people (20 million soldiers, 40 million civilians) 5 – 
that the first attempt of codifying the definition of the crime of aggression concept in 
the international legal doctrine took place. 
The atrocities committed in the Second World War led to the establishment of 
the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg in accordance with Article 1 of the 
London Agreement signed on the 8th August 1945 by the United States of America, 
the French Republic, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union6.  Article 1 set up a 
novel institutional Tribunal for the purpose of the trial and punishment of the major 
war criminals of the European Axis countries for any following crimes committed – 
the crime against peace (Article 6(a)), war crimes (Article 6(b)) and crime against 
humanity (Article 6(c))7. This made the Nuremberg Tribunal a temporary institution 
until war criminals; the responsible individuals for these crimes, of the European Axis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Naumov,	  et	  al.,	  2016:	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2	  Naumov,	  et	  al.,	  2016:	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3	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  al.,	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  al.,	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Judgment,	  1947:	  8,	  10	  
7	  United	  Nations,	  1951:	  286,	  288;	  International	  Military	  Tribunal	  of	  Nuremberg	  
Judgment,	  1947:	  11	  
	  
2	  
would be condemned. This instance can be viewed as a first attempt towards the 
codification of the crime of aggression as an ‘international crime’ in international law, 
which was legalized in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg under Article 68. However, despite the horrendous Second World War 
events and atrocities, the definition and the codification of the crime of aggression 
were not included into the international criminal law at this time9. 
 Another precedent in the codification of the crime of aggression as an 
‘international crime’ can be observed in the case of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which was circulated on 17th July 1998, entered 
into force on 1st July 2002, and amended in 201010. The ICC was established in The 
Hague to punish the most heinous crimes committed in the twentieth century based on 
retroactive jurisdiction. The idea of establishing an international criminal justice 
system re-emerged after the Cold War as the world witnessed another commission of 
heinous crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 1991-2001 and in Rwanda 
199411, which went unpunished, while the ICC was under the negotiations at the 
United Nations. These events undeniably impacted the decision of establishing the 
ICC in 1998, which is reflected in Article 1 and specified in Article 5 of the ICC 
statute12. Article 1 begins with the expression that the ICC “shall be a permanent 
institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the 
most serious crimes of international concern, as referred in [the] Statute, and shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions” by covering suspected perpetrators 
of genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes or aggression, including superiors or 
military commanders (Article 5)13. 
The ICC did not include it either as such into the international criminal law. 
As a result, this became the most disputable facet in the ICC. The ICC enlisted other 
crimes subject to its jurisdiction: the crime of genocide (Article 6), crimes against 
humanity (Article 7), war crimes (Article 8), and the crimes of aggression (Article 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Naumov,	  et	  al.,	  2016:	  147	  
9	  Naumov,	  et	  al.,	  2016:	  147	  
10	  Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  
11	  ICC,	  2017:	  3	  
12	  ICC,	  2017:	  3	  




5)14. Only, after twelve years, in the 2010 Kampala Conference, in Uganda, would the 
member states of the ICC gather in order to reach a consensus regarding the definition 
of the crime of aggression and its procedural regime that would allow the ICC to 
exercise its jurisdiction over such crime. 
It could be argued that the reasoning behind the non-inclusion of the ‘crime of 
aggression’ definition as such into the Charter of the Nuremberg or the ICC at the 
time lies in the nature of law. John Yoo defines law as ‘lawfare’, which for him is the 
continuation of politics that yields conflict/war15. This he justifies by linking to the 
Clausewitzian dictum – ‘war is politics by other means’16. With this law is referred as 
a ‘war tool’, which Luban characterizes as “species of the politicization of law” 17. 
Hereby, law becomes infiltrated by politics, i.e. a political ‘weapon’ or tool for 
nation-states to obtain and to further their political objectives through legal means, in 
order to secure their interests in the international anarchical system. Thus, the legal 
framework would be used by states to boost their comparative advantage, in order to 
maximize their hegemonic power in the international arena.  
As a result, law can be perceived to act as a ‘war or strategic tool’ as Sloan 
annotates “war [being] an instrument to achieve political goals”18. States use law to 
secure their – the Friend/Self – national interest in prolonging of their ‘way of life’ 
and survival. This will further ensure the hegemony of the Friend/Self nation-state in 
the international arena where the Enemy/Other threats by imposing its own vision of 
the ‘way of life’ on the Friend/Self. The more law becomes penetrated with the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other political distinction, the more law operates as a ‘war 
and/or strategic’ instrument through which ‘power struggle’ manifests between 
different states and different alliance systems. Consequently, a hypothesis could be 
posed that the more a state-unit or an alliance has control over legal system, the more 
secured position the state or the alliance system has in ensuring their ‘way of life’ 
prolonging in the international anarchical system.  
However, by emphasizing the ‘way of life’ tends to render Carl Schmitt’s the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other dichotomous political distinction. This dichotomous 
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  2017;	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15	  Luban,	  2011:	  1	  
16	  Luban,	  2011:	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  Luban,	  2011:	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  2012:	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distinction was recognized by the Bush Administration after the 9/11-incident stating: 
“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make, either you are with us, or 
you are with the terrorists”19. This relates to the Huntingtonian notion of ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ where the fundamental source of conflict is the division among 
humankind through culture[/cultural factors]20. Due to the difference in ‘cultural 
factors’ upheld by the nation-states, this resulted in development of the Friend/Self 
and the Enemy/Other politics. The concept of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other 
has always persisted in the human history. However, this dichotomous notion has 
been used as a ‘war and/or strategic tool’ to exaggerate the difference between the 
nation-states, especially, during the conflict times to highlight the division of cultural 
factors existing between different civilizations. This led to the problem where the 
state violence, also referred as the state terrorism or more appropriately in legal terms 
as the crime of aggression, becomes legitimized based on the inherent self-defence 
clause (UNC Article 51) and protection of own political independence and territorial 
integrity (UNC Article 2(4)). As states are perceived to be the ultimate protectors of 
their nations, they are rarely identified and/or condemned as terrorist/violent states21; 
consequently, they are usually represented as the Friend/Self.  
One could argue, if the Friend/Self superiority is taken for granted, thus is its 
violence leading to the exclusion of the Enemy/Other’s inter-subjectivity by stripping 
it from the legal status22. Hereby, the Enemy/Other becomes dehumanised through 
process of legal exception categorization where the Enemy/Other’s legal rights are 
eliminated, and, subsequently, the Friend/Self daily violence/terrorism/aggression is 
deflected on the Enemy/Other violence23. This has led to the entrenchment of 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other political agenda into the legal framework, which 
subsequently reflects the construction of the social reality, which is affected by 
“cultural and civilizational identity differences” 24. This has led to unequal and 
discriminatory treatment of states within the international anarchical system through 
the international legal system where the Friend/Self is defined as ‘exceptional’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Evans,	  2005:	  222	  
20	  Huntington,	  1993:	  22	  
21	  Zeidan,	  2004:	  495	  
22	  Gunning,	  2007:	  371	  
23	  Gentry,	  2015:	  365	  
24	  Gentry,	  2015:	  364;	  Huntington,	  1993:	  25	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granting it legitimacy for inherent self-defence, i.e. use of violence, as a victim that 
suffered a wrongful act by the Enemy/Other, i.e. aggressor.  
The Self and the Other distinction, also branded as the ‘Friend and Enemy’ 
dichotomy, was formulated by Carl Schmitt in his psychological concept of the ‘State 
of Exception’25. This framework of the ‘Exception’ studies the political process 
involving the reconstruction of the ‘Self and Other’ distinction through bureaucratic 
legal means. In this particular distinction of the ‘Self and Other’, the two opposing 
groups are set to contradict each other where one group resembles the ‘legal norm’ 
and the other ‘the legal exception’. Alternatively, in some cases, the two opposites – 
the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other – could also be viewed at the same time both the 
legal norm and the legal exception, depending on the perspective that is taken. This 
perspective depends on the cause that each state party is triggered to fight for their 
‘way of life’-values; either securing their survival by extending their hegemonic 
influence territorially, or by repelling the foreign invasion and its oppression of their 
nation-state. The perspective on who is classified as the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other depends on the sovereign, as Schmitt notes: “The sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception”26. According to Schmitt, sovereignty is granted to the 
victorious party to the conflict for the purpose to apply means of coercion and the use 
of force, in order to uphold security, order, and peace (UN Charter Article 1) for the 
purpose to endorse “humanity [as] intensive political meaning”27.  
Thus, in the case of the ‘State of Exception’, such as the Second World War 
(1939-1945), the Global War on Terror, and other majorly global conflicts, “unlimited 
authority [is prescribed that] suspends the entire existing order. In such a situation, it 
is clear that the state remains, whereas law recedes, [as] the exception is different 
from anarchy and chaos, [while] order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is 
not of the ordinary kind”28. Even though, an extraordinary situation such as war 
suspends law, yet the juristic order prevails, despite it being an extraordinary type29. 
Schmitt posits, that there is no norm that cannot be applied to chaos; instead law 
becomes ‘situational law’ where the sovereign applies monopoly power to decide 
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  Schmitt,	  1996:	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  Schmitt,	  1985:	  5	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  2011:	  7	  
28	  Schmitt,	  1985:	  12	  	  
29	  Schmitt,	  1996:	  47	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regarding order30. For instance, in the case of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal of Nuremberg or the Patriot Act 2002. As a result, the exception, same as the 
norm and the decision, remains within the framework of the juristic, as every norm 
demands a daily framework according to which it can operate on daily life basis, 
because norm requires a homogenous medium31. 
Subsequently, it is essential to understand the role of politics in the historical 
understanding of aggression as a crime, as it tends to violate the ancient and 
fundamental principle of justice – the fair trial principle32. The fair trial principle 
derives from the humanitarian understanding that determines the rights and 
obligations of any criminal charges against a person is a basic right for equal 
protection (Universal Declaration of Human Right Article 10). One could argue that 
politics yield arbitrary state behaviour that is legitimized in the legal framework, 
which allows seizing the sovereign power by declaring the exception without actually 
claiming sovereignty. This tends to manifest state violence that is known as state 
terrorism or in legal context, the crime of aggression.  
According to Zeidan, “state terrorism[, i.e. crime of aggression,] is unlawful 
use of force or repression penetrated or sponsored by a state against some or all of its 
citizens, based on political, social, racial, religious, cultural discrimination, or against 
the citizens of a territory occupied of annexed by the said state, or those of 
neighbouring or distant countries”33. States avoid the terrorist label by invoking the 
excuse of ‘self-defence’ (UN Charter Article 51), which reflects security, order and 
peace (UN Charter Article 1). This has led to the protection of state’s sovereignty 
(UN Charter Article 2(4)) by international law through disregarding their terrorism 
practice34. States are rarely identified and condemned as terrorist states or the ones 
committing the crime of aggression. Consequently, terrorism or crime of aggression 
has become to be perceived as used against the state35. State terrorism or crime of 
aggression is dangerous as it yields more violence.  
However, more violence tends to be generated through the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other framework that is exercised by powerful states. This framework 
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  2004:	  495	  
35	  Zeidan,	  2004:	  495	  
	  
7	  
juxtaposes the two opposing sides against each other by highlighting the cultural and 
ideological differences between nation-states36. Especially, in the case of the state of 
emergency, such as the Second World War (1939-1945), the Global War on Terror, 
and many other global conflicts generate the state of exception measures. They leave 
‘gaps’ in law allowing politics to enter and engrave its marks in the society where 
extraordinary order in the juristic sense prevails37. As a result, the sense of anomie – 
the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other – becomes engraved as part of legal context, 
which yields more violence by legitimizing the Friend/Self use of force, i.e. crime of 
aggression, while condemning the Enemy/Other’s use of force.  
This is especially evident in the case of the International Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg where the Allied Powers pushed a political agenda through the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg that legitimized the existence of 
enemy, while in the 2010 Kampala Conference the adopted broad definition of the 
crime of aggression reflected the political agenda of the minority of the powerful 
delegations by apprehending the majority. This demonstrates how the sovereign who 
obtains the characteristic of exception as unlimited authority creates extrajudicial 
order in the (international) community as the one “who decides on the exception”38. 
Thus, it is essential to distinguish how powerful states retain their power politics in 
the international affairs through legal framework, which legitimizes conduction of 
violence of the Friend/Self, while condemning the Enemy/Other for using it. At the 
same time, this creates an unequal hierarchical order among the states, which can 
yield more violence as certain states are in a position to wage legalized wars in the 
name of humanity. This is due to their realist ambitions in pursuit of their political 
objectives39. This demonstrates that power politics will prevail and even deepen the 
escalation of violence, i.e. crime of aggression, through legal means, even though law 
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Within the mainstream thought on the crime of aggression phenomenon, this thesis 
will discuss “The role of politics in the historical development of the crime of 
aggression”. The work will use Carl Schmitt’s psychological approach of ‘the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other’ distinction as one of the species of politics that has 
played a role in the historical development of the legal category of the crime of 
aggression. The purpose is to answer the following research question:  
 
1) How has the definition of the crime of aggression developed through out 
the history from the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg to the 
2010 Kampala Conference? 
 
To help to answer the main research question the following sub-questions will be 
observed along the way: 
 
2) How do powerful states utilize the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other 
framework to advance their political objectives through legal means? 
3) How does the distinction between the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other 
support the justification of the use of force through the legal framework? 
 
Chapter 1 will start with by discussing the methodological approach to this thesis. 
Firstly, a research perspective will be outlined. It incorporates a mainstream argument 
on the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other as a species of politics, which reflects a 
realist perspective in the legal sphere. Even though the legal sphere endorses a realist 
approach, yet it covers its holistic posture by an ethical stance within the institutions 
and structures that we are part of in the international anarchical system, such as the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and the 2010 Kampala 
Conference. These legal structures adapt Carl Schmitt’s analogy of the Friend/Self 
and the Enemy/Other as process of politicizations. Secondly, this section will evaluate 
Carl Schmitt’s concept on law and juristic order, and their linkage to the Friend/Self 
and the Enemy/Other dichotomous politics. The dichotomous politics intensify the 
difference between values upheld by different civilizations, which further exaggerates 
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and intensifies the conflict by categorizing humankind between the legal norm and 
legal exception. This will be discussed in relation to the sovereign, as Schmitt posits: 
“The sovereign is he who decides on the exception”41. 
Chapter 2 will discuss the significance of the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg in the development of the crime of 
aggression. This was one of the first attempts in history when the crime of aggression 
was formulated in the legal language, enforced and exercised where “politicians and 
military officers were held accountable for the crimes of a state in which they had 
played a major role. They were neither able to rely on national laws, which 
legitimized their actions, nor on the orders of the government or their superiors”42. 
This event demonstrated that the victorious Allied Powers defined themselves as the 
‘Self’ by positioning themselves as prosecutors, judges and executioners of the Axis 
Powers, especially the Nazi German leaders, through the legal doctrines: crime 
against peace (aggression), against humanity and war crimes. While the defeated Axis 
Powers were labelled as the Enemy/Other. They were in no position to oppose 
whatever the Allied Powers demanded. This dichotomous positioning of the 
victorious Allied Powers and the Axis Powers carrying political objectives shaped the 
legal framework of the crime of aggression discourse, which is evidenced in the 
prosecution process that helped to set up the hegemonic leadership of the Allied 
Powers in the international system in the future.  
Chapter 3 will discuss the 2010 Kampala Conference as a future perspective 
for criminalizing the act of the crime of aggression. However, two views exist on this 
perspective. On the one hand, the act of criminalizing the crime of aggression is 
assumed to operate as an attempt to stop the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics 
from interfering with the legal realm. The purpose of criminalizing the crime of 
aggression is to remove the sovereign power of exercising the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other politics by individual states, which can lead to the formation of an 
alliance system if states seem to share similar interests and values. Subsequently, the 
newly adopted amendments in Article 8 bis strives to stop the dichotomous grouping 
of the parties between the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other involved in the conflict. 
Leading to the separation and independent functioning of the legal realm from 
political realm as well as law not being used for military purposes to perpetuate acts 
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of violence, which would be justified on moral grounds. On the other hand, there is an 
assumption that the newly adopted definition on the crime of aggression in the 
Kampala Conference created a ‘boomerang effect’ where the powerful states, which 
represented the minority, overran the formulation of the crime of aggression. As a 
result, it led to a continuation of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics in the 
newly adopted legal framework. This process will be observed through three 
arguments: 1) The Article 8 bis is not compatible with the United Nations Charter – 
self-defence clause and Chapter IV – as it gave the Security Council the sovereign 
power to determine the existence of the crime of aggression before the ICC could 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression; 2) The definition of the crime of 
aggression (Article 8 bis(2)) adopted a generic formulation, which the majority of the 
delegations feared that newly adopted juristic order under the Article 8 bis(2) will not 
stop the manifestation of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics within the 
legal framework, instead allows it to flourish by creating a new situation of 
exception43; and 3) The threshold clause (Article 8 bis(1)), where the paragraph (2) of 
Article 8 bypasses the state responsibility by diverting it back to paragraph (1) that 
establishes an individual responsibility allowing the continuation of the Friend/Self 
and the Enemy/Other politics to be conducted by the powerful states, as Security 
Council appears to be blocking the case to be referred directly to the ICC.  
Finally, conclusion will elaborate on the historical development of the crime 
of aggression definition in the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg to the 
2010 Kampala Conference. Firstly, it will establish a linkage between the politics that 
the powerful states foster within the legal framework. Secondly, it will answer as how 
this process was reflected in these two cases. More particularly, as how the powerful 
states utilize the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other framework to advance their 
political objectives through legal framework, and how the distinction between the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other support the justification of the use of force, i.e. 
crime of aggression, through the legal framework. Lastly, the conclusion will provide 
a suggestion, as how should the legal framework be formulated so that it would serve 
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This thesis endorses the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other as species of politics that 
reflects a realist approach in a legal sphere. Politics can also be seen to put forward an 
ethical statement to institutions and structures that embed sets of values that we 
become part of in the international anarchical system. Example of this are the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, the 2010 Kampala Conference, 
the Charter of the United Nations, and many more multilateral institutions both 
agreements and coalitions. Though not particularly obvious these structures do adapt 
values that ingrain and shape the international affairs through process of the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politicization. As a result, according to Frost, in the 
“plural world there is no overarching set of values[, i.e. global politics], to which all 
would subscribe to [, thus] there is no clear goal towards which diverse states, nations, 
and people are moving to”44. This leads where states implement their preferred set of 
values in the world, which is likely to face sooner or later a resistance both internally 
and externally due to wide range of different ethical, religious, and cultural codes45. 
The difference on politics, which enshrines set of values, generates a dispositional 
conflict where two opposing ideologies collide. This difference, according to 
Huntington, is usually due to the cultural and civilizational differences, which creates 
a division among humankind46, which assists to develop the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other dichotomy by creating a sense of anomie in politics. E. H. Carr warns of 
the dangers of attempting to impose ‘own set of idea’, i.e. values, on how the world 
ought to be, which tends to generate a struggle between the ‘life and death’47.  
 The dichotomous nature of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics is 
shaped by our own self-interest where values, which is composed of human society 
and morality, are confined to the state that steers a political arena filled with conflicts 
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between self-interested states where the great powerful states dominate everybody 
else48. Thus, all international agreements are provisional and conditional to the states’ 
will49. In case states’ national interests are under threat, they have to be prepared to 
sacrifice their international obligations on the altar of its own self-interest, if two 
states come into conflict with each other. Therefore, treaties and other agreements, 
conventions, customs, rules, laws, etc. between states are simply expedient 
arrangements that can and will be set aside if they conflict with the vital interests of 
states. The only responsibility of the states people, according to Machiavelli, is to 
advance and to defend the national interest50. Politics is shaped by our own self-
interest, which, according to Frost, we perceive as normative idea of our 
entitlement51. As a result, this has steered a competition over supremacy of one’s 
ethics over other by constructing hierarchical ethics in international system, which has 
generated the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics legitimizing one’s use of force 
while condemning the other.  
Using the realism analogy, it can be posited that the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other politics operate as an incentive for states to pursue their self-interests, 
which allows them to apply coercive power to guarantee their survival in the 
international anarchical state system by seeking comparative advantages that would 
boost the state’s power politics. The states, controlling power politics in the 
international system, will position itself as hegemon but also, according to Schmitt, 
inscribe sovereign status allowing the state to use coercive means of use of force to 
maintain peace, order, and security (UN Charter Article 1) in the name of humanity; 
even if it means resorting to an act of aggression52. Consequently, global conflict 
waged in the name of humanity become labelled as humanitarian interventions. For 
Coady, humanitarian intervention possesses a coercive power that is regulated 
through international law and the Charter of the United Nations53. It is good to 
question how it is possible to wage an aggressive war for humanitarian purposes, or 
can aggressive war be humanitarian?54. States become alert against possible danger 
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that might undermine them or put them in disadvantageous position. The aim is to 
override the enemy, impose the winner’s will and power on the enemy, and subjugate 
the enemy under the winner’s control where, according to Kant, political prudence of 
a state is put in the continual increase of its power by whatever means to compel the 
other to do his will55. This analogy of ethical stance in politics is echoed in Carl 
Schmitt’s notion of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other when he builds up his 






ANALYSIS OF SCHMITT’S CONCEPTS 
 
 
According to Schmitt, in order for law to be effective there has to be an authority that 
decides how to apply general legal rules to concrete situations and how to deal with 
problems of contested interpretation or under-determination56. Usually authority is 
perceived to be a state, a government, or an international institution that exercises the 
sovereign power – the one “who decides on the exception”57. However, in this 
transnational system authority can also derive from unilateral or multilateral 
agreements, such as the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Nuremburg, 
or the 2010 Kampala Conference that reached a consensus on the newly adopted 
amendments to the Rome Statute. Compared to the state and government authority, 
which exercises the sovereignty, the content of the law does not determine itself as 
who has the capacity and competency to interpret and to apply it, i.e. sovereignty, 
unless otherwise stated in it, e.g. the Charter of the United Nations Article 24 sets up a 
functions and responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international peace 
and security, and, in order to protect these principles, the Security Council is granted 
powers laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII58, or as in the 2010 Kampala 
Conference delegations expressed that under the Charter of the United Nations Article 
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39 the Security Council will have exclusive competence to determine a state act of 
aggression59, which would give the Security Council the sovereign power over law. 
Otherwise, the social attitudes of the social groups, e.g. alliance system or the 
(international) society, affect the sovereign authority, e.g. an international 
organization, the World Jewish Congress, the powerful and secretive one made sure 
that the Germany’s extermination of the Jews was a primary focus of the trials, and 
that the defendants were punished for their involvement in that process60 as this posed 
a threat for the racial extinction through indiscriminate and disproportionate 
conduction of the use of force – crime of aggression. This kind of attitude tends 
usually to reflect the vision/opinion of the powerful when determining the 
development of the global politics. As a result, one could argue, it allows an arbitrary 
behaviour of the states to manifest in the international system. Schmitt describes this 
as dictatorial state, which is like an absolutist sovereign, that claims power to decide 
on the exception, but it does not claim to be the sovereign61. For instance, in the case 
of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg the Allied Powers seized the 
sovereign power by declaring the exception without actually claiming sovereignty. 
Here the sovereign obtains acts as an exception that has unlimited authority, at the 
same time suspending the existing order by replacing it with the new one62. Schmitt 
distinguishes the exception as being different from anarchy and chaos, however, 
despite of exceptional measure the order in the juristic sense does still prevails even if 
it is not of the ordinary kind63. This is due to the existence of the state as being 
undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm64. Subsequently, 
state suspends the law in the state of exception on the basis of its right for self-
preservation. As a result, the state of exception measures will extend the state’s 
coercive force as a means and methods to ensure its survival in the international 
anarchical state system by prescribing it the natural/inherent right for self-defence as 
outlined in the Charter of the United Nations Article 5165.   
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As the nature of the international system is plural it consequently leads to the 
struggle of the power politics as there is no overarching set of values to which 
everybody would subscribe to66. According to Schmitt, this intensifies the degree of 
power politics by generating the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other borderline concept, 
which depends on the union or the separation of the values67. The split between values 
depends on the nature of being different or alien, but this can only be judged by the 
participants in the particular situation, so that ‘objective’ nature would define the 
distinction between the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other 68 . This dichotomous 
disposition is only possible though the neutral domains, e.g. religion, linguistic, 
ethnic, economic, culture, and education, which do not penetrate the state and politics, 
i.e. the legal content through direct means as such69. However, the neutral domains do 
shape the values of the political sphere. In other words, the legal content, which 
embeds the sovereign will, as noted by Nye, rests on the behavioural and 
psychological attitudes70. It can be argued that these values act, as the fundamental 
constructive basis for the nation-state building in the international affairs as they 
construct the identity of the nation-state, which is later rendered into the legal 
content71.  
The Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other concept can be understood in private 
individualistic sense as a psychological expression, which can be converted into 
collective sensation, i.e. alliance system72. In this case an alliance system, which is 
composed of states that share similar visions and values, will unite forming a 
‘collective’ that will steer the international political power struggle agenda through 
the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other dichotomy. Consequently, these ‘collectives’ 
trigger a conflict by creating a dichotomy between two different polarities. According 
to Huntington, the fundamental source of conflict in the ‘new’ world will not be 
primarily ideological or economic73. Instead, the great division among humankind and 
the dominant cause of conflict will be cultural, where nation states remain the most 
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powerful actors in the world affairs, but the principal conflict of global politics will 
occur between nations and groups of different civilizations74. These values form and 
uphold civilizations, i.e. nation-states in the international affairs, but at the same time 
they juxtapose each other. It can be stated that values tend to construct ideologies of 
the nations and civilizations, which then act as a source of conflict. The difference 
created between civilizations through values allows the legal system of the nation-
state to adopt a peculiar legal identity, which, according to Schmitt 75 , tears 
civilizations and societies apart by producing violence between the Friend/Self and 
the Enemy/Other categories.  
Subsequently, the sovereign’s decision, who may appear as an independent 
state but also as an alliance system, will have a greater impact on ideologically torn 
societies76. This is due to the war strategy that presupposes that the political decision 
has already been made as ‘who is the enemy’77. The International Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg obviously embeds arbitrary behaviour allowing the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other political agenda to manifest within the international political and legal 
agenda in persuasion of their self-interests by prosecuting the Axis Powers. In order 
to survive in the international anarchical system human life depends on political 
tensions, because politically united people, i.e. political entity, fight for existence, 
independence, and freedom, thus the goal is to defeat and possibly to defeat the 
Enemy/Other78. Realism theory would term it, a survival of the fittest. 
According to Thucydides, the ‘political tensions’ or ‘survival of the fittest’ 
advances the idea that the states and the alliance systems, which are composed of 
states, are political animals/‘forums’ that are highly unequal in their powers and 
capabilities to dominate others and to defend themselves. This is very evidential in the 
case of the Nuremberg Tribunal, where independent states formed an alliance in order 
to be able to “recognize [an enemy] as the enemy”79, while in the 2010 Kampala 
Conference, the power politics of the minority overpowered the majority when 
consensus was forged over the crime of aggression definitional formulation. 
Therefore, both large and small powers have to adapt a given reality of unequal power 
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and conduct themselves accordingly in order to survive and prosper80. If a state fails 
to conduct itself accordingly, it will place itself in jeopardy, i.e. being categories as 
the Enemy/Other that threatens the ‘way of life’ of the Friend/Self. Thus, the main 
responsibility of the state is to seek the advantages and to defend its own state 
interests, in order to ensure its survival.  
In the case of extraordinary situation, such as war, will suspend law, but the 
juristic order will prevail, despite it being an extraordinary type81. The exception, just 
as the norm, remains within the juristic framework, as every norm demands a daily 
framework according to which daily life can continue to operate, because a norm 
requires a homogenous medium82. Subsequently, according to Schmitt, there is no 
norm that cannot be applied to chaos; instead law becomes ‘situational law’ where the 
sovereign applies monopolised power to decide regarding the societal/community 
order83. As in the case of the Nuremberg Tribunal the Allied Powers created the 
‘situational law’ by recognizing the enemy so that it would fit their self-interest, while 
the 2010 Kampala Conference the powerful minority seized the definitional 
formulation of the crime of aggression so that it would fit their purpose in the 21st 
century conflicts. In a situation in which a state of exception exists, sovereignty and 
dictatorship become fused in the institution of sovereign dictatorship where a new 
dictator does not defend an already existing constitution, but attempts to create a new 
one and who does so not by his own authority but in the name of the people84.  
Similar to Thucydides who declares that man is a political animal, Schmitt 
claims that man is by nature evil and licentious, and thus must be kept in check by a 
strong state capable of drawing the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other distinction of 
there is to be a social order85. This thought is parallel to Hobbes and Machiavelli’s 
vision that man is inherently dangerous86. As a result, there is a need for strong 
system that could operate as a tool of control, which would embody preventive 
detention and control order87. For instance, both Australia and the US implemented 
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counter-terroristic legal measures such as the Law Enforcement Amendment Act 2005 
and the Patriot Act 2002, which allowed the authorities (political sphere) to steer the 
control over the social sphere88. This kind of control resembles what has been done in 
the case of the Nuremberg Tribunal, where the Allied Powers seized the sovereign 
power in order to be able to convict the ‘dangerous’ suspect with criminal charges, 
while in the 2010 Kampala Conference, the powerful minority – resembling an 
alliance coalition – overran the definitional formulation of the crime of aggression 
into their favour.  
At the same time this entails legitimacy of the use of force for one side, while 
illegitimates for the other89. However, Schmitt rejects the creation of an international 
legal order based on a ‘discriminating concept of war’ what would subject the use of 
force on the part of sovereign states to substantive criteria of moral legitimacy and 
external legal control90. In the case of the First Word War, Schmitt grants victorious 
western allies licence for the application of means of coercion and for the use of force 
of methods of warfare that would have otherwise been considered to be illegitimate in 
the context of mutual legitimate belligerency91. This logic derives from the outcomes 
of the war, based on which legitimacy of the use of force is granted. Schmitt suggests 
that there is transference of jus belli into an alliance system92. This redirects the 
dichotomous sense of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other from individualistic 
political community focus into the communal political community – alliance system – 
where the use of force can be exercised at the international scale, rather than on the 
local level. In the case of international conflict, the unified political alliance 
communities, e.g. the Allied Powers or the Axis Powers during the Second World 
War, which shared common political goals – i.e. values – regarding the international 
legal order in international affairs, would form the political authority, and, thus, 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 






Although the build-up to the Second World War had begun as early as 1933, the date 
on which the conflict started is most often considered to be the 1st of September 1939; 
it would last until August 194594. The Second World War was a war of rapid 
movement. The War saw major military campaigns in regions such as the Pacific and 
the Far East, in North Africa and deep in the heart of the Soviet Union as well as in 
Central and Western Europe and the Atlantic95. Since the hostilities were scattered 
across different regions, the atrocities committed during the World War Two were not 
limited by geographical locale, i.e. the events were scattered across the globe. This 
was one of the historical instances when armed conflict hostilities, due to an absence 
of geographical location, became international, involving the vast majority of the 
world’s countries96. 
The far-reaching effects of the conflict entailed prosecutorial response to 
international war crimes committed by Nazi Germany, both at the national and 
international levels. To punish the aggression and atrocities committed by the Axis 
Powers, the Allied Powers established the International Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg. The Nuremberg Tribunal was the first international tribunal in history set 
up with the purpose to prosecute the high-ranking Nazis, who paved the way for the 
alleged commission of all the crimes, such as the crime against peace, against 
humanity and war crimes of that time97. This incident legitimized and utilized the 
legal provision of the crime of aggression for the first time in history over the trials 
that were held during the period of the 20th November 1945 and 31st August 194698. 
However, the Nuremberg Tribunal was temporary measure established with the 
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purpose to prescribe justice for those who committed the crime of aggression in the 
World War Two.  
The Nuremberg Tribunal ended up violating the ancient and fundamental 
principle of justice99 – the fair trial principle under which a person has a basic right 
for equal protection (Universal Declaration of Human Right Article 10). 
Subsequently, this event demonstrated that the victorious Allied Powers defined 
themselves as the ‘Self’ by positioning themselves as prosecutors, judges and 
executioners of the Axis Powers, especially the Nazi German leaders, through the 
legal doctrines for committing crime against peace (aggression), against humanity and 
war crimes. While the defeated Axis Powers were labelled as the Enemy/Other, where 
they were in no position to oppose whatever the Allied Powers demanded. This 
created an unequal perception of the international actors in the international system. 
Here the Allied Powers were seen as the Friend/Self-serving justice by advancing 
morality in the international arena, while the Enemy/Other was perceived as evil, i.e. 
immoral, who spread death, violence and brutality, which resulted in the ‘collective 
trauma’ and ‘collective anxiety’100.  
This created a one-side representation of the actors at the international forum 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal. This can be explained through Schmitt’s analogy where 
the victorious party was granted with the sovereign power that decides on the 
exception. Consequently, the victorious party being entitled to apply means of 
coercion and use of force, in order to uphold the international principles of the peace, 
order, and security in the name of humanity101. Thus, the Allied Powers were 
positioned as sovereign representing the superior and moral actors in the international 
system, while the Axis Powers were seen as inferior and immoral actors who 
committed horrendous crimes. This gave explicit and authoritative judicial legitimacy 
to the Allied Powers to create charges for this special occasion, in order to 
exterminate the perpetrators of the Holocaust102.   
This logic embedded a moral attitude within a legal domain, which segregated 
deeds into legal norm and legal exception spheres. This gave the legitimate power for 
the Allied Powers as the Friend/Self to condemn actors as legal exception in the 
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international anarchical system. As a result, this advanced the sense of morality in the 
international system where the Friend/Self symbolizes the higher both political and 
legal justice in the international system by becoming labelled as the legal norm. For 
Schmitt, the self-declaration of the Friend/Self as the legal norm was only possible for 
the Allied Powers as they acted on behalf of the humanity aiming to preserve peace, 
order, and security103. This procedure took place for the first time in the Prior 1943, 
followed in the Moscow Declaration 1943, and, finally, in the London Agreement 
1945. According to Schmitt, this is possible to achieve only by seizing the power of 
sovereignty, which automatically will assign itself the Friend/Self label – which will 
decide on the exception104. Schmitt describes this process as where the sovereignty 
and emergency powers merge together forming basis for a strong executive power 
unhampered by constrains of legality105. This has led to a scenario where the 
sovereign, the Friend/Self, is positioned simultaneously within the legal framework 
and outside it as Agamben describes it: “exterior to the normally valid legal order”106. 
As a result, the Allied Powers positioned themselves as the prosecutor, judge and 
executioner of justice by acquiring executive and legislative powers simultaneously 
representing the morality within the international system though the legal framework. 
This, at the same time, excluded the Allied Powers from being prosecuted for the use 
of coercion and methods of force of warfare against the Axis Powers, which would 
under other circumstances be considered illegitimate act107.  
Furthermore, it can be argued that, from the Allied Powers perspective by 
acting as the executive and legislative powers they aimed to preserve the “life form” 
108, i.e. the ‘way of life’. While the Axis Powers tried to eliminate it, i.e. they 
threatened the ‘way of life’ of the Allied Powers. In other words, there was a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ to borrow Huntington’s terminology, but in a ‘power struggle’ sense as 
realists posit. The end result of the ‘power struggle’ would entail establishment of the 
victorious the Friend/Self’s hegemonic ruling order globally as the only moral system 
governing the international affairs both politically and judicially.  
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By witnessing the heinous crimes committed by the Nazis against Jews, 
gypsies, socialists, communists, homosexuals, mentally ill, Soviet prisoners of war, 
freemasons, Jehovah’s, witnesses, Romani, and disabled it can be argued that Hitler 
saw these categories as ‘plague’, inferior, to the German racial superiority, which 
represented an obstacle to Hitler to become the hegemonic power ruler in the 
international anarchical system 109 . The Allied Powers saw this as a threat to 
international peace, order, security, and to their ‘way of life’, which could be 
paralleled to the analogy that President Bush posited after the 9/11-incident: “Our 
way of life, our very freedom came under attack”110.  
However, this can also be viewed in reverse, the Axis Powers, perspective. 
Hitler argued in his Mein Kempf book that the German race was on the verge of 
historical and political extinction against the forces of communism and the Jewish 
phenomenon111. Hitler saw the German ‘way of life’ being under threat by other 
groups that existed in the world. In order to protect Germany from extinction and 
against foreign threat and invasion Hitler adopted aggressive politics, as the Allied 
Powers perceived it. This kind of approach created two different ideologies, which 
clashed causing blaming and victimization of each other. Both approaches aim to 
claim the sovereign power to decide on the exception (the Other/Enemy) and the faith 










In January 1933, after Adolf Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany, he envisaged 
two types of goals for the new world order – short-term and long-term goals, in order 
to make Germany a great power again. All these doctrines – Hitler’s aims and 
political ideologies – were laid down in his book, Mein Kempf (My Struggle)112. 
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These goals show the persuasion of states’ self-interest where both “power and 
deception are conduct[ed in Germany’s] foreign policy, in order to secure the supreme 
political value, the national freedom, such as independence” 113  and racial 
supremacy114. This very same conclusion was reached by the Nuremberg Tribunal 
stating that “war as an instrument of national policy was already a crime based on the 
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928 (the Kellogg-Briand Pact)”115. It 
could be posited that both Hitler’s goals, which formed Germany’s national policy of 
that time, could be interpreted as crimes. 
Long-term goals involved creating a new great power, a Greater Germany. 
This goal would unite all German-speaking people inside the Reich who lived in 
Austria, in the borderlands of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the lost territories of 
the East116. However, there were doubts about whether Hitler intended to go beyond 
these aims. Firstly, in order to sustain Germany’s great power, the latter needed to 
acquire land by seizing the rest of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the Soviet Union 
as far as the Ural Mountains in order to maintain Germany’s necessities such as living 
space, food and industrial supplies117. For this purpose, Hitler stated: “National 
borders are only made by man and can be changed by man”118. Secondly, Hitler 
enforced the ‘Final Solution’-policy, which would conduct racial profiling to 
determine potential harmful individuals that would be categorized depending on their 
race, ethnicity and religion119. His ambitions were already recorded in 1937 in Hitler’s 
Hossbach memorandum where he perceived the Jews as well as Polish and Russians 
as a threat to the German nation120.  
Short-term goals contained defying the Treaty of Versailles – condemnation of 
the other nations of Europe and the League of Nations in order to rebuild a mighty 
new army and air force121. Hitler never accepted Germany’s defeat in 1918 and the 
First World War peace settlement conducted in the Treaty of Versailles, in the Hall of 
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Mirrors at Versailles by the Allied Powers122. Germany was not allowed to participate 
in this peace settlement, having had little choice but to sign the Treaty of Versailles 
despite the strong objections. Hitler described this kind of peace settlement as ‘Diktat’ 
(dictated peace) 123 . He interpreted all of these servitudes as humiliating and 
unacceptable. In response to the grievances surrounding the Treaty of Versailles, and 
driven by his own ‘lust for power’124 Hitler became the Fuhrer of Germany, deploying 
politics of the ‘state of exception’,  
Here the ‘state of exception’, according to Schmitt, meant establishment of 
unlimited authority where the suspension of the entire existing order occurred125. 
Thus, Hitler was able to position himself as the sovereign who determined the legal 
norm (the Friend/Self) and the legal exception (the Enemy/Other). As a result, the 
state of exception allowed the order in juristic sense to prevail in extraordinary 
circumstances by upholding validity of the statehood over the legal norm 126 . 
Furthermore, the state of exception allowed juxtaposing of the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other dichotomy, which meant the rivalry over hegemony between two 
different power camps’ survival – the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers. As a result, 
the nature and structure of the state of exception abolished the restrictions and defied 
the imposed laws and restrictions set by the Treaty of Versailles – e.g. lost territory 
both in Europe and African colonies, disarmament, reparation, and the War Guilt 
clause127 –, which resulted in use of extraordinary measures that led to heinous crimes 
being committed against peace, order, and humanity, i.e. crime of aggression.  
However, mere planning to be criminal, cannot rest on the single declaration 
of a party government. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the conspiracy must be clearly 
outlined in its criminal purpose, as it must not be too far from the time of decision and 
of action128. Nonetheless, the events show that the goals set up by Hitler were indeed 
implemented where Germany committed crime of aggressions against Austria129, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
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Greece, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the United States130. In the Nuremberg 
trials, the Tribunal observed that planning and preparation for aggressive war had 
been carried out in systematic manner131. It could be posed that this kind of foreign 
policy, or goals, conducted by Hitler’s Germany aimed at creating a gap and 
disposition between the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other. Hitler did not want to be 
assimilated with other nations on equal footing. Instead, he wanted to create the 
‘supreme German nation’, which would stand above the others132.   
Furthermore, the act of the Treaty of Versailles, according to the classical 
realist, Morgenthau, could also be understood as the human ‘lust’ for power133. Here 
the international agreement of the Treaty of Versailles acts as an urge for power that 
would secure the Allied Powers’ political space within the international system as the 
sovereign Self against the Enemy the Nazi Germany, by downplaying it and labelling 
it as the aggressor. Thus, the Nazi Germany became labelled as the legal exception by 
the Allied Powers’, which positioned themselves as the Self, i.e. moral actor within 
the international system, making them the legal norm. Subsequently, these war events 
split the world into two alliance systems. As a result, each alliance system – the Allied 
Powers on the one hand and the Axis Powers on the other – could pursue their own 
personal interests in the warfare by justifying their acts on moral basis.   
In both cases, depending on the perspective, the ‘lust for power’ drives the 
‘power struggle’ between two different power camps, generating the psychological 
and dichotomous conflict between the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other – between the 
German Fuhrer and the Parties to the Treaty of Versailles. Germany appears either as 
the victim of the war (the Friend/Self) or the losing side of the war (the 
Enemy/Other), or the Parties to the Treaty of Versailles appear either as the winners 
of the war (the Friend/Self) or the dictators of the peace (the Enemy/Other). 
Correspondingly, this could be understood as a struggle for power between two 
different power systems where whatever the aim might be, power is an immediate 
goal, which enables to influence the adversary’s behaviour.  
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According to Nye, there are two definitions of power. The first one is ability 
to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants (i.e. soft power), 
while the second defines power as the possession of capabilities or resources that can 
also influence the outcomes (i.e. hard power)134. Both powers are related, because 
they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the 
behaviour of others. However, Gray takes the view on power even further by linking 
it to politics. For him politics is about the distribution of power, while strategy is 
about influencing the will of an adversary135. In other words, politics produces 
strategy that emanates power. It could be argued that the Treaty of Versailles embeds 
strategic objectives that allowed the Allied Powers to pursue outcome one wanted and 
to boost ones power by overcoming the adversary. For instance, France and Poland’s 
territorial gain of Alsace-Lorraine and West Prussia. These regions contained 
industrial infrastructure that was essential for Nazi Germany’s military development 
and its power politics as it allowed to advance national security and development, and 
to pursue political objectives136. It can be argued, according to Emmott, that the 
state’s power politics depends on resource availability and its utilization for nation-
state building137. By confiscating the German industrial complexes through legal 
means of the Treaty of Versailles and incorporating them into French and Polish 






THE HUMAN LOSSES AND THE HOLOCAUST  
 
 
The more territories were occupied by Germany in Europe, the more Jews and other 
groups of people from the Soviet Union, Poland and other areas were incorporated 
into the German Reich, the more power and resources did Nazi Germany accumulate. 
All this, contributed towards the attainment of political objectives138. If a state hopes 
to survive and prosper, it has to pursue such strategy that would enrich itself with the 
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resources, which would lead to hegemonic power that is composed, as Brzezinski 
defines, of money, production capacity and military power. Through Germany’s 
occupation of more territories in Europe strived to provide food and industrial 
supplies for German people, and living space in which the excess German population 
could settle and colonize139. 
As the Allied Powers proceeded into Germany and Poland, they discover 
evidence of atrocities. For instance, in Poland, in 1944 it was discovered that 1.5 
million people were murdered at Majdanek – the majority were Jews, Soviet prisoners 
of war, Poles who opposed the German occupation – and, between December 1941 
and May 1945 in Chelmno, 5.7 million Jews were murdered140. At least 20 camps 
were set up by the Germans to carry out the Holocaust141. However, in addition to 
Jews there were also non-Jews murdered – gypsies, socialists, communists, 
homosexuals, mentally ill, Soviet prisoners of war, freemasons, Jehovah’s, witnesses, 
Romani, and disabled142. Many died because of disease, starvation, massacres, 
bombing, and deliberate genocide. There are estimates that 60 million people died in 
the war (20 million soldiers, 40 million civilians)143. It has also been approximated 
that the Soviet Union lost around 27 million people during the war, almost half of all 
the Second World War deaths; and approximately 85% of total deaths were on the 
Allied side144. However, many deaths went undiscovered, thus there are many 
statistics that present estimates of the death tolls of the war casualties in the Second 
World War. 
It could be posited that Germany, especially Hitler’s racial politics, 
categorized human beings by stereotyping them as mentally and behaviourally 
disordered that they operated as virus destroying the “public hygiene”145. Those 
human beings who were labelled as the ‘non-hygienic’ were treated as legal 
exceptions. Hitler’s reasoning behind labelling certain humans categories as ‘non-
hygienic’, i.e. legal exception against which the use of violent coercion – aggression – 
was permitted, was due to his vision that these human beings were ‘not pure German 
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race’, i.e. non-Aryans. According to Hitler, mankind could be divided into two 
groups, Aryans and non-Aryans. The Aryans were the Germans – tall, blond, blue-
eyed and handsome; they were the master race, destined to rule the world146. All the 
rest – Slavs, coloured peoples, especially Jews – were inferior; excluded from the 
‘national community’ along with others who were considered unfit to belong; the 
Slavs were destined to become the slave race of the Germans147. The number of the 
human losses in the Holocaust demonstrates the extent to which Hitler’s Germany 
was willing to take its political framework of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other, in 
order to make Germany the master race as well as the global hegemony, which would 
posses the exceptional executive and judicial powers in the international affairs that 
would also contribute in setting up its own international order to which the rest of the 
international community would be bound to. In order to be able to carry out these 
heinous crimes against humanity Hitler used the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other 
politics to shape his political agenda through the humanitarian and nation-building 
principles, which led to a public support that gave him the necessary legitimate power 






THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL OF NUREMBERG  
 
 
The evidence that the Allied Powers – the United Kingdom, the United States and the 
Soviet Union – had been presented with in the Moscow Declaration on aggressive 
politics conducted by Hitler’s Germany – the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded 
mass executions – led to the setting up of the International Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg. The agreement for the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal of Nuremberg was signed in London on 8th August 1945. The foundation of 
the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg acted as a prosecutorial response to 
these international crimes that occurred at both the national and international levels. 
On 11th December 1946, the General Assembly resolution 95(1) was adopted, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Lowe,	  2005:	  309	  
147	  Lowe,	  2005:	  309	  
	  
29	  
initiated the judgment procedure on the 1st October 1945148. The International 
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg sentenced twelve Nazi defendants to death and seven 
to periods of imprisonment raging from ten years to life.  
 Nonetheless, all the discussion on authorization of the prosecution of the 
crime of aggression perpetrators and the first attempt to establish the definition of the 







PRIOR TO 1943  
 
 
The initiator of launching the inquiry on the responsibility of Nazi Germany’s crimes 
– for unleashing horrendously global and cruel war with numerous human casualties, 
and breaching elementary principles of the international treaty law – was the 
government of the Soviet Union149. This inquiry demonstrates that the Soviet Union 
acts as a sovereign that determined the exception (the Enemy/Other) in relevance to 
the subject (the Friend/Self) who appears to be the victim of these crimes. This 
situation for Schmitt quoted by Agamben, sets up an essential proximity between the 
state and the sovereign where the sovereign proclaims the state of exception150. Due 
to the ‘political crisis’ – horrendously global and cruel war with numerous human 
casualties – the sovereign (the Self), the Soviet Union, pushed forward the concept of 
the exceptional measures on Nazi Germany (the Enemy/Other). This, simultaneously, 
created unequal treatment of nation-states, which led to the dichotomous conflict 
between great powers of that time – the Allied Power and the Axis Powers.  
The enactment of exceptional legal measures by both alliance systems was due 
to the manifestation of the political crisis in intentional affairs. The political crisis 
embraced the notion of ‘power struggle’ between two power camps where each 
upheld its own ‘way of life’ vision. One could argue that, the political crisis 
manifested upon the clash of the ‘way of life’ generating the Friend/Self and the 
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Enemy/Other dichotomy. In the case of the Nuremberg Tribunal the heinous crimes 
committed by Nazi Germany pushed the international community into the political 
crisis by throwing it into ‘hysteria’. The ‘hysteria’ led to the establishment of the 
alliance system, the Allied Powers, who positioned themselves as the upholders of the 
legal norm, which automatically labelled them as the ‘sovereign exception’. 
Acting as the ‘sovereign exception’ allowed the Allied Powers to relate the 
legal measures of the state of exception to suspend their own coercive and use of 
force151. This led to the legitimization of the use of force by the Allied Powers in 
order to counter and to contain the enemy, while the enemy’s use of force becomes 
criminalized as crime of aggression. This created a disequilibrium as how things 
would be perceived. More particularly the Allied Powers arbitrarily positioned 
themselves as the legal norm, the Self, while condemning the other side as the 
aggressor, the Enemy/Other. This kind of political tactic created a dichotomy between 
the victims (the Friend/Self) and the oppressors/aggressor (the Enemy/Other). This is 
evidenced in the reports presented by the Soviet Union at the international conference 
in London 1941 and in other following recorded notes. 
 The very first warning statements presented by the Soviet Union took place at 
the international conference in London on 24th September 1941 and in the upcoming 
documents as well. These documents dispatched information that on 25th November 
1941: “About the outrageous atrocities committed by German authorities in respect to 
the Soviet Union’s prisoners of war”152; on 6th January 1941: “Widespread robberies, 
the devastation of the population and the monstrous atrocities committed by German 
authorities in the occupied Soviet territories”153; on 27th April 1942: “About the 
monstrous atrocities, atrocities and violence of the German Fascist invaders in the 
occupied Soviet territories and about the responsibility of the German government 
and the command for these crimes”154; and on 14th October 1942, the USSR issued a 
further statement: “The responsibility of Hitler’s invaders and their accomplices for 
the atrocities committed by them in the occupied territories [of the USSR and] in 
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Europe”155. Therefore, the Soviet Union demanded that the German leaders and their 
associates should and would be severely punished156.  
According to Schmitt, referred by Agamben, these statements objectify ‘the 
Enemy/Other’ – Nazi leaders and their associates – and push the object outside the 
law by categorizing it as a ‘legal exception’ where the only “pure evil and violence” 
exists157. Consequently, by objectifying the other side of the party to the conflict, the 
Enemy/Other, also leads to the criminalization of its actions, i.e. its use of force by 
labelling it as crime of aggression. The other party to the conflict, compared to the 
former one, is seen to promote morality in the international system, which upholds 
peace, order, and security; as codified in one of the UN’s purpose and principles in 
the UN Charter Article 1(1). The one acting on behalf of morality, labelled as the 
legal norm or the Self, becomes authorized to use force against an enemy that is 
threatening the moral norms of the international system, i.e. ‘the way of life’. By 
forging such concept, which applies to both the political and legal realms, allows the 
sovereign, the Self, to establish the ‘emergency situation’. It could be argued that the 
law fluctuates. It tries to create ‘spaces of operation’ where one’s actions, in this case 
the Allied Powers actions are defined within the legal framework, legal norm, while 
other – the Axis Powers – actions are outside the legal framework, legal exception. 
Hereby, the state of exception acts as the “space of enclosed systems” where two 
alliance forces or two different ‘ways of life’ collide against one another leading to a 
situation in which legal exception, the Enemy/Other, becomes part of the legal 
norm158. This tends to create a paradoxical relationship between the Friend/Self and 
the Enemy/Other where the latter is down played as shown in the following 
announcements posited by the Soviet Union. 
The 14th October 1942 statement also expressed a desire that all interested 
states would engage in mutual cooperation in the search and extradition of guilty 
perpetrators, Nazi leaders and their associates, to the tribunal in order to hold them 
accountable for the committed crimes and enforce the execution of the punishment for 
organizing and/or committing a crime in the occupied territories159. However, the 
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main point of all these statements was to highlight the recognition of the immediate 
need to bring the Nazi leaders and their associates, who were in the process of 
creating a war, to justice in front of the international tribunal and punish them 
according to the strictest criteria of the criminal law160. This legitimate aspiration 
expressed in the statements, which was put forward by the USSR, was also shared 
with other states – Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Greece, Belgium, 
Holland, Luxembourg and France161.  
The process of objectification of the enemy – the Nazi Germany and its 
associates – aims to criminalize this category and its actions by labelling them as a 
legal exception. For Schmitt, the legal exception is not codified in the existing legal 
order; rather it is characterized as extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the 
state162. This high awareness of the ‘extreme peril and danger’ is demonstrated in all 
the Soviet Union’s statements, which started with the first warning document 
presented at the international conference in London on 24th September 1941 and 
followed by others on 25th November 1941, on 6th January 1941, on 27th April 1942 
and on 14th October 1942 dispatching information on the danger and outrageous 
atrocities concerning prisoners of war and widespread robberies in occupied 
territories committed by the Nazi Germany163. 
According to, the French philosopher of thought systems, Foucault, this kind 
of criminal stereotyping of the Axis Powers by the Soviet Union at that time could be 
described as a mental and behavioural disorder that operates as virus destroying the 
“public hygiene”164. The ‘virus’ yields “social danger or insanity [in the international 
community’s] living conditions”165. To control this danger or insanity, according to 
the sociologist, Giddens, a ‘strong social body’166 is required, which can be achieved 
though legal and political realms. These realms desire to control the danger hidden in 
human behaviour, as “the state of mental disorder is incompatible with the legal 
responsibility, thus immune for legal consequences”167. As a result, according to 
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criminologist, jurist, philosopher and politician, Beccaria and philosopher, jurist and 
social reformer, Bentham, “penal justice must [be placed to] cure this illness of 
society”168.  
The horror of the crimes has to be reflected in the punishment, which the 
Soviet Union emphasized in their early warning statements between January 1941 and 
October 1942. Accordingly, the process of objectification of the enemy could be 
characterized as a tool that “steers the morality of the social sphere”169 by announcing 
what constitutes to be civilized (the Friend/Self) and pathological stigma (the 
Enemy/Other) that consequently criminalizes, not only the individuals, but also the 
nations as the Enemy/Other170. As a result, the Nazi leaders and their associates 
became criminalized and categorized as legal exception, while the Soviet Union and 
the Allied powers remained within the realm of legal norm. Although, one could 
argue, that the Allied Powers acted arbitrarily on their own initiative by taking the 
power of criminalization, categorization and objectification into their own hands by 
becoming the sovereign who represent the legal norm in the international system and 
who decides on the exception. However, Schmitt posits the opposite. For him this act 
was not arbitrary, rather he grants the victorious allies the sovereign power in order to 
be able to exercise means of coercion and the use of force in order to uphold security, 
peace and order in the international system171.  
On the other hand, the process of criminalization of the object leads to a 
paradox between the legal right for violence and the law that aims to protect a given 
life form, i.e. ‘way of life’. This statement can be applied to both sides of the conflict 
in the case of the Second World War – the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers. Both 
sides declare that their ‘way of life’ has been threatened, authorizing the state of 
emergency measures by legalizing the use of force, in order to counter the threat and 
to ensure one’s security and survival. Prior to the 1943 Moscow Declaration, the 
Soviet Union (the Friend/Self) tried to protect the ‘life form’ by distancing itself from 
the crime perpetrators and at the same time to criminalize the perpetrators – Nazi 
Germany (the Enemy/Other) – and its illegal use of force and its horrendous atrocities 
taking place in the occupied territories. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  Foucault,	  1978:	  8	  
169	  Lumby	  and	  Funnel,	  2011:	  281	  
170	  Foucault,	  1978:	  10	  
171	  Vinx,	  2014	  
	  
34	  
 All these assembled proclamations, which took place prior to the 1943 
Moscow Declaration, demonstrated the Soviet Union’s awareness and construction of 
the threat of Nazi Germany. The idea of ‘spreading danger’ is reflected in 
Machiavelli’s thought that the “world is a dangerous place”172. However, according to 
the Critical Terrorism Study author, Hurd, posits that the meanings and practices that 
form the social world are never static; they are constantly changing and evolving173. 
Thus, if a state hopes to survive and prosper in the international anarchical system, it 
has to enrich itself by accumulating power and wealth. In case of the Soviet Union, it 
tried to accumulate power against the enemy by forging a collaborative work through 
a system of alliances. For Thucydides, the formation of an alliance system is an 
obvious method for strengthening the odds of victory174. However, an alliance system 
is only possible to form up when the parties share a similar vision or ‘way of life’. In 
other words, the documents, presented by the Soviet Union, point out the warning 
signs of the danger – heinous and torturous atrocities committed by the Nazi Germany 
in respect to prisoners of war, widespread robberies and occupation of European 
territories in order to supply necessary resources to provide food and industrial 
supplies for German people, and living space in which the excess German population 
could settle and colonize175 – to the other Allied Powers in order to establish that there 
was an urgent need for collective action, in order to stop the ‘menace’ from spreading 
and engulfing the world into the terror. Otherwise, if the states would fail to act 
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THE 1943 MOSCOW DECLARATION 
 
 
After “receiv[ing] evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass 
executions”176 , and “people and territories suffer[ing] from the worst form of 
government by terror”177 conducted by the Hitlerite forces in many countries, the 
Allied Powers decided to forge a joint alliance collaboration. However, the reasons 
for a joint collaboration of the Allied Powers can be viewed in two different ways: 1) 
Form an alliance system where the idea of territorial integrity and political 
independence drives people and states to experience collective and mutual security, 
and/or 2) As for Hobbes, the unification of forces is driven where the community 
shares mutual ‘emotional distress’178. In this case, it could be argued that both reasons 
were present. The reasons arose more like in a ‘domino effect’. As the forces of the 
Nazi Germany perpetrated violence in many countries in Europe, engulfing many 
territories under its tyrannical governance 179 , they threatened many countries’ 
existence – both territorial integrity and political independence – thus generating an 
‘emotional distress’. As a consequence, the Allied Powers endorsed the Moscow 
Declaration 1943 of joint collaboration, in order to neutralize their common enemy, 
the Nazi Germany, which threatened their ‘way of life’. 
On 1st November 1943, the Allied Powers – the US President, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader, Joseph 
Stalin – issued a joint declaration denouncing the war crimes perpetrated by the 
Nazis. Their determination was to punish the major war criminals, the German 
officers, and their associates, the members of the Nazi Party, “who have been 
responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities, massacres and 
executions”180. This shows that the other Allied Powers – the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America – agreed with the Soviet Union on the concept of 
‘spreading danger that threatens our way of life’ emitted from the Nazi Germany. As 
all the Allied Powers shared the common opinion they were willing to continue 
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hostilities together against their common enemy, the Axis Power, in order to “ensure 
[a] rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and establishing and maintaining 
international peace and security with the least diversion of the world’s human and 
economic resources for armaments” 181 . It could be posited that the Moscow 
Declaration operated as an initial stage where through the joint declaration the Allied 
Powers together pledged to point out the menace, the Nazi Germany, in the 
‘international social body’. Hereby, the Moscow Declaration constructed the very first 
conception, understanding and the formulation of unconstitutional offense of the 
crime of aggression. 
This was outlined in the Moscow Declaration that gave the power to the Allied 
Powers to deploy politics of the ‘state of exception’ in the legal realm, in order to 
prosecute perpetrators of the crime of aggression: “The above declaration is without 
prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular 
geographical localisation and who will be punished by the joint decision of the 
Governments of the Allies”182. I.e. to determine what constitutes a legal norm (the 
Self, which tries to preserve the life form) and what constitutes a legal exception (the 
Other/Enemy, which tries to destroy any life form). It could be posited that the 
attempt of including the definition of the crime of aggression in the Moscow 
Declaration made it possible the concept of the legal exception to be aggravated into 
the legal norm. 
On the other hand, it made it more legally acceptable to wage war and 
hostilities against something that was legally labelled as ‘abnormality’. Subsequently, 
the founding of the crime of aggression definition carried a ‘double-edged sword’ 
meaning as it was stated in the Moscow Declaration: “1) That their united action, 
pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemy, will be 
continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security, 2) That those 
of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters to the surrender 
and disarmament of that enemy, 3) That they will take all measures deemed by them 
to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy, 
4) etc.”183.  
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Luban describes this kind of labelling of ‘abnormality’ as:  
 
“Wars [that] are waged in the name of humanity [where humanity] has an 
especially intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy 
in the name of humanity it seeks to embed a new universal concept against its 
military opponent”184.  
 
More specifically, any conflict that has been conducted aims to emphasize the 
difference between the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other. There is a collision between 
two different ‘ways of life’ where one ‘way of life’ will prevail over the other. Nardin 
observes this process as “remaking regimes according to [victor’s] own vision”185. 
Schmitt parallels this process of ‘remaking regime’ as “humanitarianism [being] 
extraordinarily dangerous” 186  where the participating parties in the conflict are 
inherently unequal. There are great power states and many smaller and lesser power 
states, which are easily overridden by the great powers’ hard and soft powers. 
Leading to the notion where the “politics remain primary in the sense that it is up to 
political actors to decide when an actor in the international community becomes 
politically dangerous”187. It could be posited that the aim of pushing the codification 
of the crime of aggression in the Moscow Declaration, as Schmitt would argue, was to 
“recognize [enemy] as the enemy” 188. This would embed the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other politics into the legal context for the future reference in case a dispute 
would arise. At the same time, through this process the Allied Powers were able to 
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THE LONDON AGREEMENT 1945 – THE CHARTER OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF NUREMBERG 
 
 
Pursuant to the Moscow Declaration 1943, the Governments of the United States, 
France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union signed the London Agreement on 
8th August 1945, which acted in the interest of all the United Nations189. This 
Agreement provided that the International Military Tribunal to be established for the 
purpose of the prosecution and punishment of major war criminals of the European 
Axis whose offences had no particular geographical location; as stated in the 
Nuremberg Charter Article 1 190 . Establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal, it also 
introduced a new legal term, the crime of aggression, for the first time into the 
international criminal law context. Forging a new legal term, according to Foucault, 
tends to create a new “disciplinary society, i.e. spaces of enclosure”191 where a new 
space has its own set of rules as well as different control mechanisms192.  
However, this creates a paradoxical relationship between society and the 
sovereign – simultaneously pursuing ‘life and death’. Foucault explains this paradox 
yielding a goal and a function where the sovereign rules on death, rather than 
administering life193. Foucault’s wording on “to rule on death than administer life”194 
is similar to Schmitt’s notion on ‘sovereign’s decision will have a greater impact in 
ideologically torn society’195. Meaning that the state of exception is a ‘disciplinary 
mode’ that juxtaposes the two dichotomous opposites – the Friend/Self, the Allied 
Powers, and the Enemy/Other, the Axis Powers. This increases the ‘power struggle’ 
through violence and/or the aggression between the two dichotomous alliance systems 
as each alliance aims to pursue their hegemonic power in the international affairs, 
which would allow them to claim a legally unrestricted ius ad bellum196.  
At the same time, on the other hand, each party of the dichotomy aims to 
preserve the ‘life form’ of their own ‘way of life’ by pointing out the menace in the 
‘international social body’, in order to ensure their survival in the international 
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anarchical system. This logic is reflected in Schmitt’s explanation of the political 
tension between the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other where the purpose for 
existence, independence, and freedom of the society and the nation-state is dependant 
on the juxtaposition of two opposites197.  
Subsequently, this frames freedoms through tool of control of confinement198. 
As the Self and the Enemy/Other are prescribed different ‘control mechanisms’, so 
are the freedoms depending on their legal status that the individual or the nation-state 
has in the international system; whether classified as the legal norm or legal 
exception. These ‘control mechanisms’ emanate from the political entity199, i.e. the 
sovereign who decides on the exception200. In this case, the Allied Powers acted as the 
sovereign who decided on the scope of the control mechanisms for the Other/Enemy – 
the Axis Powers – by signing the London Agreement in order to create: 1) 
Responsibility for the Other for its actions that took place in the past and for the 
present, 2) Referring to the identity that is labelled as the exception in legal norm201, 
and 3) Attempt of inclusion of the new legal term, the crime of aggression, into the 
international criminal legal context.  
 The scope of the ‘control mechanisms’ of the jurisdiction was laid down in the 
Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, which 
was annexed and formed an integral part of the London Agreement202. This legal 
provision provided that the Tribunal should have power over persons who had been 
acting on behalf of the European Axis and its interests, whether as an individual or as 
members of an organization, should be tried and punished. The crimes the individual 
or the members of the organization committed should be held accountable for the 
following crimes listed in sub-paragraphs of Article 6203:   
 
(a) Crimes against peace: Namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging 
of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, 
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agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
(b) War crimes: Namely, violation of the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or 
deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population 
of or in occupied territory, murder to ill-treatment of prisoners of war or 
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity. 
(c) Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war, or persecution on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connexion with any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated.  
 
Three other further extensions and assurances of the Allied political power in the 
sphere of ‘control mechanisms’ encompassed: 1) “leaders, organizers, instigators and 
accomplices, participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes, are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plan” and 2) “the official position of 
defendants, whether as heads of State or responsible officials in government 
department, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating 
punishment (Article 7)”, as well as 3) “the defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment, if the Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires (Article 8)”204.  
 The scope of criminal responsibility laid down in Articles 6-8 of the Charter of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal can be associated with the power of politics that functions as 
a ‘control mechanism’ that establishes an idea where one ‘enjoys advantage and 
domination over others’. This notion of power can be interpreted in several ways. 
Hans Morgenthau, a neoclassical realist, poses a pessimistic view on human nature. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




He links human nature to the ‘will to power’. ‘Will to power’, according to 
Morgenthau, is most evident in politics and especially in international affairs where 
“politics is a struggle for power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, 
power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and 
demonstrating it determines the techniques of political actions”205. A similar view is 
also shared by Machiavelli and Hobbes, for whom the acquisition, possession, 
deployment, and use of power are a central concern of political activity. As a result, 
international politics is portrayed as ‘power politics’, as “arena of rivalry, conflict, 
and war between states in which the same basic problems of defending the national 
interests and ensuring the survival of the stare repeat themselves over and over 
again”206. 
Furthermore, the power argument posed by the realists can be taken a step 
further by linking it to the ethical concerns. Frost argues that the power concept is 
born within self-interest, which is determined by ideas that we consider to be entitled 
to207. According to Frost, ideas, which help to form self-interest, embed ethical 
standing within both the individual and the authoritative institutions208. However, 
each actor in the international community stands for and pursues different ideas – i.e. 
values such as freedom, equality, justice, human rights, democracy, and etc. –, or the 
same values but through different argumentation, and/or different means and 
methods. It could be argued that the ideas that carry ethical concerns are reduced to 
self-interest, which are reflected into the legal context by the sovereign. In the case of 
the Charter of the Nuremberg, the victorious Allied Power were grated with the 
licence to act as the prosecutors, judges and executioners of the Axis Powers allowing 
them to root their ideals and values into the international legal context that would 
shape the international affairs as well as endow them with the sovereign, hegemonic, 
powers.   
At this point of history only crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity were inscribed into the international criminal law; no crime of 
aggression was included as such, which reflected the sovereign’s ideals and its self-
interest at the time. However, there is a paradox that includes both similarities in 
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using force, but differed, in its purpose use. In order to contain the threat emanating 
from Nazi Germany at that time the Allied Powers had to commit to the use of force, 
i.e. aggression, as well. Similar to the Axis Powers – who used force, i.e. aggression, 
aiming to expand their Germanic territory, accumulate resources and living space, as 
well as committing horrendous human killing atrocities, in order to ensure Germanic 
racial supremacy – the Allied Powers used force, i.e. aggression, to stop and to 
contain the spread of the danger that threatened the Allied Powers’ ‘way of life’. In 
order not to fall under the same category of accusation as the Axis Powers, the Allied 
Powers avoided the inclusion of the crime of aggression as such crime into the 
international criminal law. This, according to Schmitt, allowed the Allied Powers as 
the victorious alliance to exercise coercion and the use of force of methods of warfare, 
which would otherwise be considered to be illegitimate in the context of mutual 
legitimate belligerency, in order to defend their ‘way of life’ against an Enemy/Other 
threat. As a result, this created unfair treatment of the adversary party to the conflict.  
This led to the situation where the state of exception produced a “zone of 
autonomy into the law”209 where sovereign’s power is anchored in the legal order. 
Thus, the sovereign becomes external to the normally valid legal norm. As a result, by 
excluding the crime of aggression, as defined by international criminal law, at that 
time from the Charter of the Nuremberg, allowed the Allied Powers to stand outside, 
and yet at the same time belong to the legal order. This allowed the Allied Powers to 
practice coercion and the use of methods of warfare and at the same time not being 
accused for it. This is unique nature of the state of exception where, Schmitt argues, 
order in the juristic sense does prevail even of it is an extraordinary in nature allowing 
the sovereign210 – the Allied Powers – to uphold the statehood for the self-defence 
cause211. 
This allowed the sovereign, the Allied Powers, to distinguish themselves as 
the Self from the Enemy/Other in the situation where they can decide over the 
exception”212.  This led to a split of the parties to the conflict, where the Self viewed 
itself as ‘the good side’ or the victim, and the Enemy/Other was seen as ‘the bad side’ 
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or the aggressor. This, according to Haenel, gave “states the power[, for the Allied 
Powers,] to make all goals of humanity its goals too”213. 
This led to the dichotomous split within the international society where it was 
easier for the sovereign, the Self, to point a finger at the Enemy/Other and make it 
responsible for all the events and casualties that took place. In this case, the Axis 
Powers had to carry the criminal responsibility for all the crimes that occurred during 
the Second World War – crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. Weber argues that, the Charter of the Nuremberg accused the “Nazi 
conspirators” for carrying out their crimes as part of a great “Common Plan or 
Conspiracy” 214, which is usually linked to Hitler’s Mein Kempf book that operates as 
a confirmation of the Axis Powers crime of aggression intentions.  
It can be posited that the Nuremberg Tribunal issued judgment on behalf of 
the Allied Powers, which violated fundamental principle of justice – the fair trial 
principle by removing the basic right for equal protection (Universal Declaration of 
Human Right Article 10) – where the Allied Powers acted as prosecutors, judges and 
executioners of the German leaders and its associates. One could argue that the 
Nuremberg Trials organized not to dispense impartial justice, but rather for political 
purposes215. British alternative judge at the Nuremberg Tribunal, Sir Norman Birkett, 
annotated on the political justice, which was pursued in the Nuremberg Trials, in his 
private letter in April 1946 that “the trial is only in form a judicial process and its 
main importance is political” 216. While the chief US prosecutor and a former US 
Attorney General, Robert Jackson, declared that these trials at the Nuremberg were 
“continuation of the war effort of the Allied nations” against Germany217, which 
echoes Clausewitzian dictum on ‘war is politics by other means’. Weber argues that 
these charges were specifically created for this occasion and were applied only to the 
defeated side, Germany, where it had no position to oppose whatever the Allied 
Powers demanded218.  
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Taking Luban’s idea of “lawfare [being] species of the politicization of 
law”219, this led to the politicization of the legal affairs that took place when the 
Nuremberg Charter was codified. This becomes most apparent in the Article 2 and 3 
that act as the backbone of the ‘power politics’ where “the Tribunal shall consist of 
four members, each with an alternate” (Article 2) and “Neither the Tribunal, its 
members not their alternates can be challenged by the Prosecution, or by the 
defendants or their counsel” (Article 3) 220 . Firstly, Article 2 secures the four 
members’ – the US, UK, France and the USSR – positions as the sovereign, the Self, 
in the international system. Further securitization of their position occurs in Article 3 
where the four members’ sovereign power became anchored in the legal order. As a 
result, the four members became part of the legal order. Through Articles 2 and 3 they 
legalized themselves as legal body, at the same time as the members represent nation-
states they were at the same time outside the legal system. Here they created their 
own immunity from being prosecuted for the same accusations as the Axis Powers. 
This was pointed out by chief US prosecutor and a former US Attorney General, 
Robert Jackson, when declaring that the Nuremberg Tribunal “is a continuation of the 
war effort of the Allied nations” against Germany. He added that the Tribunal “is not 
bound by the procedural and substantive refinements of our judicial or constitutional 
system”221. 
Following Schmitt’s work, the state becomes fused with the notion of 
sovereignty that embraces politics within itself by producing the dichotomous notion 
of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other into the social sphere, in order to uphold the 
‘way of life’ of own and projecting this fusion into the legal affairs222. Thus, the role 
of politics manages to penetrate the legal realm and, as a result, it engraved its agenda 
according to the one that defined itself as the Friend/Self. Even some of the Allied 
Powers privately acknowledged that the Nuremberg Trials were not organised in 
impartial justice, but rather for political purposes223 as the British alternate judge at 
Nuremberg, Sir Norman Birkett, in April 1946 elaborated in a private letter that “the 
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trial is only in form a judicial process and its main importance is political”224. Hereby, 
the Charter of the Nuremberg – decree issued by the European Advisory Commission 
on 8th August 1945 – annexed to the London Agreement 1945, is a political tool that 
steers the international system into the favour the Allied Powers, in order for them to 
obtain their political objectives through legal means. Here the legal apparatus 
operated as a strategic tool deployed by the international actors, the Allied Powers, 
that, following Clausewitz’s dictum, could be put as the continuation of power 
politics by other means.  
However, the least discussed and less obvious matter in the politicization of 
the lawfare was the influence and involvement of international organizations such as 
the World Jewish Congress and the World Zionist Organization. This reaction 
stemmed from the heinous atrocities committed by the Nazi Germany, which focused 
on the extermination of Jews as described in Hitler’s book, Mein Kampf. For Hitler 
Jews were seen as threat to the German nation, which he saw was at the verge of a 
historic racial and political struggle225. One of the indicative political natures and least 
renown of the Nuremberg process was the role of the Jews in organizing these trials. 
For instance, Nahum Goldmann, one-time president of both the World Jewish 
Congress and the World Zionist Organization, pointed out in his memoir that only 
after persistent efforts were the World Jewish Congress officials able to persuade the 
Allied leaders to accept the idea to prosecute Nazi leaders226 and their associates, the 
groups or organizations – the Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, 
the Schutztaffeln (known as the SS), the Sicherheitsdienst (known as the SD), the 
Geheime (known as the Gestapo), the Sturmabteilungen (known as the SA), the 
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces227. As a result, an 
international organization, the World Jewish Congress, the “powerful and secretive 
[one] made sure that the Germany’s extermination of the Jews was a primary focus of 
the trials, and that the defendants were punished for their involvement in that 
process”228 as this posed a threat for the racial extinction through indiscriminate and 
disproportionate conduction of the crime of aggression. 
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The role that the World Jewish Congress and the World Zionist Organization 
played was crucial in defining the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other relationship in the 
Second World War; the Friend/Self being the victim, and the Enemy/Other being the 
aggressor. Thus, political distinction allowed actions and motives to be reduced to the 
Self and the Other dichotomy, i.e. Friend-Enemy perception, where the degree of Self 
and the Enemy intensity differ depending on the union and separation of the 
dichotomy229. For Schmitt, this led to the development of the psychological sense of 
‘collectivity’ that manifests in the political attitude of the State’s domestic social 
affairs230. By forging a collective sense, e.g. the World Jewish grouping, has produced 
a dichotomous perception of the international system through a split, identification, 
and a sense of belonging to one or the other group. However, this identification or 
categorization to one group or the other is not always obvious and does not always 
depend on the individual’s or state’s will. In this case, the World Jewish community 
managed to influence the categorization that formed the sense of ‘collectivity’. 
Simply put, the only party to the conflict that did not commit such atrocities towards 
Jews as the Nazi Germany was the alliance system of the Allied Powers. Based on 
this logic, it was obvious that the World Jewish organizations would promote their 
prosecution agenda with morality to the Allied Powers as they were solely seen 
accountable in the international system. 
Despite the collective moral impact of the World Jewish organizations, which 
Judge Iola T. Nikitchenko shared in terms of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Russians being 
conducted by the Nazi regime, who presided at the Tribunal’s opening session, he 
also possessed strong opinion at the joint planning conference shortly before the 
Nuremberg Tribunal convened; Nikitchenko explained the Soviet view by stating231:  
 
“We are dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already been 
convicted and whose conviction has been already announced by both the 
Moscow and Crimea (Yalta) declarations by the heads of the Allied 
governments… The whole idea is to secure quick and just punishment for the 
crime…” 
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“The fact that the Nazi leaders are criminals has already been established. The 
task of the Tribunal is only to determine the measure of guilt of each particular 
person and mete out the necessary punishment – the sentences” 
 
Nikitcheno’s announcement intensified the distinction between the Other and the Self. 
It deepened the sense of union, i.e. collective sense, between the Allied Powers 
against the aggressor, the Enemy. It created a psychological and moral perception that 
manifested in the political attitude of the statecraft. This in turn set up a state of 
exception where the evil would find itself included in the law, but at the same time, 
according to Schmitt, outside the law where the “pure evil and violence” 232 
manifested – “the fact the Nazi leaders are criminals has already been established”233. 
However, according to Schmitt, the state of exception is the culmination of the legal 
order after what order breaks down, unless the legal exception is returned back to 
legal norm sphere. By giving jurisdiction to the Nuremberg Tribunal through the 
London Agreement the state of exception was created, which distinguished clear a 
categorization between the Self, the Allied Powers, and the Other/Enemy, the Axis 
Powers. It gave clear slipt between those that were included within the legal norm 
sphere, the Allied Powers, and those that were excluded from it, the legal exception, 
the Axis Powers. Thus, the Allied Powers gained the sovereign power, in order to 
decide on the exception, the Other/Enemy – the Axis Powers. Correspondingly, this 
kind of alignment of facts leads to the assumption where the Charter of the 
Nuremberg, which was annexed to the London Agreement 1945, acts as a political 
agenda, in order for the Allied Powers to obtain their certain political objectives 
through legal means by positioning themselves as the sovereign, the Self, and the 
other party to the conflict as the responsible one, the Enemy/Other. 
 However, there were several difficulties concerning the identification and 
collection of proof for legal purposes. Even though the names of the chief German 
leaders and their associates were well known and the proof of their guilt would not 
offer difficulties, yet the crimes were committed on a large scale that led to the 
problem of identification, trial and punishment of their perpetrators234.  It is almost 
impossible to establish the offender’s identity or connect him/her with the particular 
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charges, as the witnesses might already be dead, or otherwise incapacitated and 
scattered235. Thus, the London Agreement’s outlined difficulties on war crimes, 
gathering proof would be laborious and costly as well as prove to be mechanically 
problematic, as it would involve uncovering and preparing proof of particular 
offences one of appalling dimensions236. Further complication of attempt to punish 
the Nazi leaders and their associates for their atrocities committed by them involved 
legal difficulties. Many atrocities, as noted in the 24 March 1944 statement, had 
begun during peacetime, and escalated during wartime237. These pre-war atrocities 
were neither war crime in technical sense or offences against international law238. 
However, the United Nations declared a policy where these crimes – war crimes, 
crime against humanity and crime against peace – would be punished as it was in the 
interest of post-war security, order and peace and necessary for rehabilitation of 
German people as well as the demand of justice239. 





UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 95(1) 
 
 
On 20th November 1945, the Nuremberg Trial began and ended on 31st August 
1946240. During this time the Tribunal held “403 open sessions, heard 33 witnesses for 
the prosecution against the individual defendants, and 61 witnesses, 19 of the 
defendants gave evidence for the defence. 143 witnesses gave evidence for the 
defence by means of written answers to interrogatories. Regarding the accused 
organizations, the Tribunal appointed commissioners to hear evidence. 101 witnesses 
were heard for the defence before these commissioners, while 1809 affidavits from 
other witnesses were submitted. 6 reports were also submitted, summarizing the 
contents of a great number of further affidavits. 38000 affidavits, signed by 155000 
people, were submitted on behalf of the political leaders, 136213 on half of the SS, 
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10000 on behalf of the SA, 7000 on behalf of the SD, 3000 on behalf of the General 
Staff and OKW, and 2000 on behalf of the Gestapo. The Tribunal itself heard 22 
witnesses for the organizations”241.    
Three weeks after the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg rendered 
its judgment on 1st October 1946; the following individual defendants – Herman 
Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst 
Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, 
Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Karl Doenits, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, 
Fritz Saukel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Frantz von Papen Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 
Albert Speer, Costantin con Neurath, and Hans Fritzschen – were found guilty, while 
following groups – the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, the SD, and the 
Gestapo – were found guilty. However, the Tribunal declined to make that finding 
with the SA, the Reich Cabinet, and the General Staff and High Command242; the 
General Assembly convened the second part of its first session in New York243.  
Instead of setting up a temporary tribunal, the US initiated a request to 
reaffirm the principles set in the Nuremberg Charter. It can be posited that this was 
the first instance in history when the codification of the ‘crime of aggression’ was 
attempted. However, the crime of aggression as such was not included into the 
Charter of the Nuremberg. Instead the crime against humanity, crime against peace, 
and war crimes were prescribed there. As a result, on the 23rd October 1946, at the 
opening meeting the importance of the Charter of the Nuremberg was recognized244. 
The US President Truman addressed the General Assembly by referring to the Charter 
of the Nuremberg as: “The path along which agreement may be sought, with hope of 
success,” among all countries “upon principle of law and justice” in order to better 
protect mankind from future wars245. This event aimed at transforming the Nuremberg 
principles from temporary nature into permanent one with the US’ initiative. This 
meant that the notion of the sovereignty of the Allied Powers would also be translated 
into the permanent effect by identifying them, as the Friend/Self, and the ones from 
now on challenging or breaching these principles laid down in the Nuremberg Charter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241	  United	  Nations,	  2003:	  5-­‐6	  
242	  United	  Nations,	  2003:	  7-­‐8	  
243	  United	  Nations,	  2003:	  11;	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  95(I),	  1946:	  1	  
244	  United	  Nations,	  2003:	  11;	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  95(I),	  1946:	  1	  
245	  United	  Nations,	  2003:	  11;	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  95(I),	  1946:	  1	  
	  
50	  
would be labelled as the Enemy/Other. As the Allied Powers managed to solidify 
their sovereign seat in the international arena, at the same time they positioned 
themselves as an extra juridical body – belonging to the legal norm, but at the same 
time allocated outside of it. The Allied Powers created their own immunity protection 
against their own legal doctrine, which cannot be used against them, but only against 
those that questioned their power political sovereignty. Thus, the politicization of the 
‘crime of aggression’, which took place during the London Agreement, became 
codified into an international legal system.  
Furthermore, the US President Truman continued: “I remind you that 23 
Members of the United Nations have bound themselves by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal to the principle that planning, initiating or waging a war of 
aggression is a crime against humanity for which individuals as well as States shall be 
tried before the bar of international justice”246, which clearly indicated inclination for 
categorization, i.e. a dichotomous split, of both individuals and states into the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other categories. This is evident when he points out that 
the particular 23 members of the United Nations that have bound themselves to the 
Nuremberg Charter, which categorized them as the Friend/Self, i.e. the sovereign, as 
the victorious party to the conflict in the international system247. While the status of 
the rest of the international community, which was not part of the Nuremberg Charter, 
remained uncertain regarding their allegiance, either it lied with the Allied Powers or 
with the Axis Powers. As a result, a question arises as whether they should be 
considered as the Friend/Self or the Enemy/Other.  
On 24th October 1946, in the US President Truman’s Supplementary Report 
on the Work of the Organization (A/65/Add.1), delivered before the General 
Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations advanced the proposition that 
the Nuremberg principles should be made a permanent part of international law: “In 
the interest of peace, and in order to protect mankind against future wars, it will be of 
decisive significance to have the principles which were implied in the Nuremberg 
trials, an according to which the German war criminals were sentenced, made a 
permanent part of the body of international aw as quickly as possible”248. As a result, 
according to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Nuremberg trials gave 
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rise to new principles leading the progressive development of international law and its 
codification, as declared: “From now on the instigators of new wars must know that 
there exist both law and punishment for their crimes. Here we have a high inspiration 
to go forward and begin the task of working toward a revitalized system of 
international law”249.  
 This statement resembles the purpose and principles outlined in the United 
Nations Charter Article 1. Correspondingly, it can be argued that there appears to be a 
tendency to assimilate the Nuremberg principles and the United Nations principles, 
i.e. to create interdependence between them. This became psychologically perceived 
as ‘collectivity’ where the Self, the Allied Powers – the US –, tries to expand its 
sphere of influence through other more internationally powerful institutions that also 
represent themselves as the Self and possess greater political and legal authority, 
which grants more legitimate status of the sovereignty. This makes it more legally 
acceptable to wage war and hostilities against something that was legally labelled as 
‘abnormality’, which threatens the peace, order, and security of the international 
system.   
This led where the sovereign, the Self, acts as the ‘double-edged sword’. 
Firstly, their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their 
respective enemy, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace 
and security; secondly, those of them at war with a common enemy will act together 
in all matters to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy; and thirdly, they will 
take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of 
the terms imposed upon the enemy250 as noted by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations on pointing out that the Nuremberg principles should be made a permanent 
part of international law. According to Luban, this kind of labelling of ‘abnormality’ 
leads to where the “wars are waged in the name of humanity [where humanity] has an 
especially intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the 
name of humanity it seeks to embed a new universal concept against its military 
opponent” 251. This, according to Schmitt, makes war a strategy where it presupposes 
that the political decisions have already been made as ‘who is the enemy’, i.e. defined 
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identity of the enemy252. By linking the Nuremberg principles at that time to the 23 
Members of the United Nations and to its purpose and principles that the United 
Nations upholds tends to create a strong sense of ‘collectivity’ of the Self, i.e. 
sovereign, in the international system. Anybody challenging or breaching the United 
Nations ‘sense of collectivity’ will be labelled as the Enemy. As a result, any 
instigator of new wars will be from now on be punished according to the existing law 
for their crimes, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out253.  
On 12th November 1946, the aims of ‘sense of collectivity’ of the Self was 
pursued by, the American member of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Judge Bibble’s 
recommendation report to the President of the United States that “the United Nations 
as a whole reaffirms the principles of the Nuremberg Charter in the context of a 
general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind”254. In 
response to this recommendation letter President Truman stated, “a code of 
international criminal law to deal with all who wage aggressive war… deserves to be 
studied and weighed by the best legal minds the world over” in support of the United 
States’ delegation, he expressed the hope that the United Nations would carry out 
Judge Bibble’s recommendations255. Further securitization of the Allied Powers as the 
Self was taken by the United States on 15th November 1946, where the United States 
delegation presented the proposal on ‘Resolution relating to the codification of the 
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal’ 
by referring to the Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations that warrants 
the progressive development of international law and its codification. Firstly, “this 
would reaffirm the principles of the international law recognised by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal”, and secondly, “the General 
Assembly should direct the Committee of the Progressive Development of 
International Law and its Codification to be treated as primary importance in the 
formulation of the principles of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and those 
found in the Tribunal’s judgment in the context of a general codification of offences 
against the peace and security of mankind on in an international criminal code 
(A/C.6/69).  
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 By referring to Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations and 
linking it to the principles of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and to the 
Tribunal’s judgment of offences against the peace and security of mankind gave the 
Allied Powers, the United States, a possibility to pursue and to secure their/its 
‘sovereign stability’ in the international system even after the Nuremberg Tribunal 
had been held. The logic behind this is to create a societal order. According to 
Schmitt, during war times both law and the constitution cease to exist and instead it 
creates both the state of emergency and state of exception in the social order256.  As a 
result, the power to decide on the enemy and prescription on verdicts on life lies in the 
hands of political entity that has defined itself as the sovereign – in this case, the 
Allied Powers in the Second World War. As the Second World War came to an end, 
according to Schmitt, politics disappeared where human life depended on the political 
tension257, which created the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other dichotomy. According 
to Schmitt, if the disposition of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other disappears from 
the political life, then the ‘way of life’, which secrets morals, motives and justice, will 
disappear as well leading to depoliticization – neutralization – of the international 
community where there will no longer manifest conflicts between different parties 
through ideological, civilizational, or in power struggle manner258.  
  As a result, on 11th December 1946, on the initiative of the US delegation, the 
General Assembly Resolution 95(1) was adopted unanimously that affirmed the 
principles of the international law by recognizing the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the Tribunal judgments, which was then directed to the Committee on 
the Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification to consider for 
the formulation of those principles259. This resolution made it sure that the Allied 
Powers position would be secured within the international system. More particularly, 
the Allied Powers became associated with the United Nations as the ‘Self-institution’ 
in the international system that “maintain[s] international peace, order, and security 
and takes effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threat to 
the peace, [order and security]” as defined in the Article 1 of the Charter of the United 
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Nations260. Consequently, the political phenomenon retains its influence in the 
international legal sphere where anything that would challenge or breach the United 
Nations principles and its purpose would be labelled as the Other/Enemy.  
Thus, the context of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other groupings remain to 
pertain in the international system. Where politically united people or community will 
fight for the existence, independence and freedom based on the decision emanating 
from the political entity. In this case, as the Nuremberg principles and the Tribunal 
judgments have been ‘fused’ with the United Nations threw the General Assembly 
Resolution 95(1) this creates a new identity of the Self in the international system. 
Instead of being politically united people within a state, the nation-state system would 
reform into politically united community that would fight for their “existence, 
independence, and freedom based on the decision emanating from the political 
entity” 261  that defines itself as the Friend/Self, the sovereign in the modern 
international system – the United Nations. The more collectivized the nation-states 
become, the more united the political entity becomes, consequently, the more 
powerful as well262.   
The international institution, the United Nations, became politicized as well 
through war/conflict, just to mention a few cases such as the Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda genocide, or the War on Terror cases. The ‘meaning of existence’ where 
one’s human life and its ‘ways of life’ are threated – similar to the Allied Powers 
during the Second World War, motivates these ‘a just war/conflicts’. The more the 
international community faced heinous crimes against humanity, the more idea of an 
international criminal justice system re-emerged after the Cold War263. As a result, it 
can be argued that the international institutions like the United Nations became to 
deploy politics of the ‘humanitarian project’ in tackling the crime against humanity264. 
Accordingly, distinction between the Friend/Self, the United Nations, and the 
Enemy/Other groupings will prevail within the international system. However, the 
distinctions between the groupings does not solely rely on morals, motives, justice or 
economics, unless they intensify the political realm, which would translate into the 
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Friend/Self-Enemy/Other distinction, only then the conflict is politically driven as it 
defines what drives human motives. A will to abolish war is a political motive, 
because the enemy is viewed as a monster, a threat, which must be defeated and 
destroyed at any cost265, in order to preserve humanity. Forging a conflict/war serves 
the political purpose, according to Schmitt; this would uphold the legitimacy of the 
statehood within the international community where plurality of different ideologies, 
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CHAPTER 3: THE 2010 KAMPALA 






Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, the UN has considered establishing 
a permanent international criminal court266. After years of negotiations, a Diplomatic 
Conference – the Rome Conference 1998 – was held from 15th June to 17th July 1998 
in Rome, Italy where the adoption of the Rome Statute marked an establishment of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) 267 . The adoption of the Rome Statute, 
according to Kofi Annan, signalled, “hope to future generations and a step forward in 
the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law”268. More than 160 
governments participated in the conference from which 120 nations voted in favour of 
the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court269. Only seven 
nations voted against the treaty, including the United States, Israel, the Peoples 
Republic of China, Iraq, and Qatar, while twenty-one countries abstained270. At the 
end of the Conference the Statute was open for signature and ratification.  
The establishment of the ICC marked a major progress in development of 
international humanitarian law271. It took a step in tackling the impunity. However, in 
order for the Court to be effective, a large number of states had to ratify the Rome 
Statute and to adhere to the entry into force regulations as set forth in the Statute 
Article 126: “Enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following 
the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations”272. Despite the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court treaty was held in 1998, which established 
the International Criminal Court, only after four years it entered into force on 1st July 
2002273. 
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Even though states may share a similar vision on countering international 
crimes, yet they are hesitant to subscribe to the international institutes such as the 
ICC. In this process they tend to ‘give up’ some part of their sovereign power to the 
international institute that will have the “right and obligation to exercise domestic 
jurisdiction with respect to act of crime committed by another state”274. Thus, the 
ICC’s jurisdictional power to prosecute an individual for the international crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as laid down in the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, extends to the domestic legal affairs. 
This makes the ICC a supranational organization that stands above state’s 
sovereignty. Due to this effect states are hesitant to sign, to ratify, and, finally, to be 
bound by the international treaties and the obligations that it brings along, and in 
some cases, as in the ICC, prescribing own jurisdictional power over state’s domestic 
legal affairs. For instance, in the case of the US, it previously signed the ICC, but later 
formally withdrew from its signature and indicated that it did not have an intention to 
ratify it. This is a new turn in both the international political and legal affairs where it 
is normally perceived that states are the ultimate actors in the international system; no 
other institute stands above them. On the other hand, international 
institutions/organization reflect state’s will that allows these entities to meet their ends 
and needs by endowing them with characteristics that might be needed, e.g. organs 
and powers – that is prescribed in institute’s/organization’s jurisdiction –, in order to 
succeed in their operations275. 
As a result, the ICC, established in Hague, had jurisdiction over suspected 
perpetrators of genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes or aggression, including 
superiors or military commanders (Article 5)276; as condemned in the Article 1: 
 
“The International Criminal Court (“the Court”) is hereby established. It 
shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most 
serious crimes of international concern, as referred in this Statute, and shall 
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and 
functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute”.277  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274	  Scharf,	  2012:	  359	  
275	  Klabbers,	  2002:	  8	  
276	  ICRC,	  2017;	  Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  Article	  5	  




Though the ICC was established for the purpose of punishing the most 
heinous crimes committed in the twentieth century, the most disputable facet in the 
Rome Statute appeared to be the crime of aggression. The Rome Statute 1998 enlisted 
the following crimes, which the jurisdiction of the Court would cover – the crime of 
genocide (Article 6), crimes against humanity (Article 7), war crimes (Article 8), and 
the crimes of aggression (Article 5)278 – yet it did not include the definition of the 
crime of aggression into the legal document at that time despite of all the cruelties 
committed during the First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1939-
1945), the former Yugoslavia 1991-2001 and in Rwanda 1994279. Only, after twelve 
years, in the 2010 Kampala Conference, in Uganda, would the member states of the 
ICC gather reach a consensus on the agreement on the definition of the crime of 
aggression and its procedural regime, which would allow the ICC to exercise its 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression category as, according to Ferencz and 
Eisenhower, “the world can no longer rely on force but must turn to the rule of law or 
else it will end all civilization”280.  
This was due to the escalation of competing needs, ideologies, and aspirations 
in the international community that resulted in the international frictions and 
conflicts281, which further advanced the ‘abyss’ of conflicts that manifest in the 
international affairs. These security dilemmas urged the development of preventing 
the most heinous crimes of international concern from reoccurring in the future again 
together with the motivation to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes282. However, it is essential to note that the notion of the criminality of waging 
aggressive war is based on the ‘legacy’ of the Nuremberg Tribunal, thus making the 
crime of aggression exclusively focused on state behaviour283. The definition, which 
was established prior-2017 in the ICC, set forth that only “state leaders and state 
officials with enough authority to engage the state’s forces into aggressive action can 
be considered for the crime of aggression”284. Thus, the ICC’s jurisdiction allows the 
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state to escape the responsibility for committing the crime of aggression and keep on 
prosecuting the state leaders and/or state officials.   
However, this state-centred approach has been challenged with the increased 
tensions in the international society and with the twentieth century conflicts. 
According to Kaldor, there has been a decline of ‘old wars’ – “war[s] involving states 
in which battle is the decisive encounter” –, while the new type of conflict, the ‘new 
wars’, have emerged blurring the distinction between war, organized war, and large-
scale violations of human rights, and as such involve networks of both state and non-
state actors where most violence is directed against civilians285. Nevertheless, the 
Article 8 bis:  
 
Paragraph (1): “’For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”286. 
 
Paragraph (2): “For the purpose of the paragraph 1, ‘act of aggression’ means 
the use of force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations”287.  
 
– as one could argue, both the definition (Article 8 bis(2)) and the threshold clause 
(Article 8 bis(1)) – considers the implication for state responsibility making the new 
jurisdiction of the ICC to resolve the issue of interaction between two international 
law systems – the law of state responsibility and international criminal law.  
Despite the fact that once the crime of aggression was described as the 
‘supreme international crime’, yet was conspicuously left out from the international 
criminal law jurisdictional regime, which derived from the Nuremberg Tribunal’s 
‘legacy’. However, in the 2010 Kampala Conference the Review Conference on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court finally reached an agreement on a 
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definition of the crime of aggression. Under this definition no individual would be 
found guilty of aggression, compared to previous jurisdiction, unless the ICC has first 
found that a state has committed an act of aggression288. Rather than raising 
apprehension about the concept of aggression as a source of state liability, instead it 
puts a question forward regarding to what extent – the threshold clause – the ICC 
findings impact the responsibility of a state of aggression. In other words, how the 
newly defined international criminal law agenda in Article 8 bis reflects the Carl 
Schmitt’s agenda of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other in the newly formulated the 










The majority of the delegations, such as France, the UK, China, Russia, the US, Iran, 
Israel, Cuba, Brazil, and Norway, posited in one way or another, that the amendments 
were not compatible with the United Nations Charter289. They argued that it gave the 
Security Council the monopoly to determine the existence of an act of aggression. As 
a result, they referred to it as “the primacy” and “prerogatives of the Security 
Council” in maintaining international peace and security290. These delegations viewed 
that under the United Nations Charter Article 39, the Security Council has exclusive 
competence to determine a state act of aggression291. Leading to the assumption 
where the ICC would not be able to proceed with a case in the absence of a Security 
Council’s determinations on the crime of aggression, e.g. as China delegation 
expressed that the “articles failed to reflect the idea that, with respect to the issue of 
an act of aggression, it is necessary for the Security Council to make a determination 
of its existence first before the ICC could exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression”292. Thus, embedding the possibility of the process being politicized, 
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which can yield Schmitt’s notion of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other when 
solving disputes in international affairs.   
One of the concerns posed by the Iranian delegation viewed the amendments 
to be incompatible with the United Nations Charter Article 51, which ingrains the 
‘inherent self-defence’ clause293. Article 51 sets a sovereign clause that preserves 
state’s natural/inherent right of war-making: “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations…”294. This allows the states to 
preserve their sovereign and legitimate political power in the international affairs; that 
no other actor – especially an international organization that are entities that reflect 
states’ will, which is prescribed in the international institutions/organization’s treaty – 
cannot stand above the ultimate political actor, the state295. According to Iranian 
delegation, a danger regarding the limits of the legal armed force remains in two cases 
within the Charter – legitimate individual self-defence where a State is the object of 
armed aggression, and when the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter 
authorizes the Member States of the United Nations to use armed force296. 
However, the original purpose of the new Article 8 bis was to strip the 
powerful states from their sovereign power from acting as the ‘Friend/Self ‘-hegemon 
who preserved the morality in the international system. Thus, the powerful states 
would be unable to prescribe the anomie to the Enemy/Other, which dehumanizing 
them. The purpose of the new Article 8 bis is to transfer the jurist, prosecutor and 
executive powers, which the Allied Powers exercised during the Nuremberg 
Tribunal297, to a third and neutral party that would act on behalf of the international 
community by observing the peace and security. According to the Iranian delegation 
opinion the Conference failed to criminalize the act of aggression and to authorize a 
third party Court to determine the acts related to the crime of aggression, which would 
have brought to completion the work begun by the Nuremberg Tribunal298. Iranian 
concerns were verified through Judge Dr. Hans-Peter Kaul’s annotation where the 
“permanent members of the Security Council should understand that the amendments 
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agreed in Kampala are no infringement on the powers of the Security Council, but a 
further strengthening of it authority; and the Security Council will, in the future, have 
the power to refer aggressions as a crime to the ICC”299.   
One could argue, that the new Article 8 bis aimed to erase the exercise of 
power politics of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other in the international affairs by 
the powerful States by establishing a structural limitation through international 
institutions, e.g. the UN and the ICC, to govern the conduct of the crime of 
aggression. According to defensive realist, Kenneth Waltz, the structural factors have 
limited how much power the powerful states can gain and exercise in the international 
relations, which tends to ameliorate security competition300, but at the same time 
intensifies the competition for power by undermining the international security, 
peace, and order of international community. The structural limitations occurred 
through transfer of the power politics from the states, which identified themselves as 
the Friend/Self in preserving the peace, security, and order in the international 
relations; to a new authority, the UN and the ICC, that would from the 1st January 
2017 on act as the sovereign authority preserving the legal order. As expected, the 
delegations of France, the UK, and the US posed a concern that their unilateral power 
to prescribe anomie to an Enemy/Other, as they did during the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
would be removed. The US expressed a the critical point by supporting France and 
the UK delegations’ view, that “the primacy of the Security Council under Article 39 
of the United Nations Charter in determining the existence of an act of aggression and 
the Council’s primary responsibility with regard to matters of international peace and 
security” and, thus, the US “believe[d] that the Review Conference has made a wise 
decision to delay implementation of the crime of aggression to permit examination of 
the practical implications of the two methods being proposed for the 
operationalization of this crime” 301. Instead, this power to condemn and prosecute a 
state for crime of aggression is now according to new amendments in the Rome 
Statute placed on the Security Council, which can then refer the case to the ICC. 
However, as the international institutions are entities set up by the states, thus, using 
Schmitt’s analogy, they are unstable to uphold sovereign authority and the legal order 
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in the international anarchical system302. States are the ultimate political actors that 
possess the power to govern their survival in the international state system and do to 
the final decisions regarding the peace, order, and security in the international affairs.  
As a result, according to Schmitt, the new Article 8 bis has led to the process 
of ‘depoliticization’ where the disappearance of tensions, which forms the 
dichotomous distinction of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other, has led to 
neutralization of values that construct morals, motives and justice303. As the state’s 
individual values disappear, so do the tensions between different conflicting parties. 
The disappearance of values, which the states uphold, can be linked to the removal of 
power politics from the international affairs between powerful states, which have 
yielded the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other conflict. Instead, the power of 
determining the existence of an act of aggression has been given to the Security 
Council304, which has led to the neutralization of power politics as no longer would 
states unitarily or though alliance system forge supreme and imperative values in 
international relation over other states’ values. This opinion was expressed by two 
delegations. Brazil stated that the “amendments adopted represent a comprehensive 
compromise deal that is acceptable to all State Parties, even though it does not reflect 
entirely any delegation’s initial position on the matter”305. A similar view was also 
expressed by Russia noting that “any consensus, not all the elements of the consensus 
decision satisfy everyone” 306 . As a result, the Security Council, composed of 
permanent members and non-permanent members, has to cooperate together by 
upholding and maintaining analogous/equivalent values, which prevents ‘the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other’ politics from being exercised. This has resulted an 
argument by the delegations from France, the UK, China, Russia and the US posited, 
that the amendments are incompatible with the United Nations Charter, as states are 
not able to impose their unitary values over others, thus not able to form the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics, which according to Judge Dr. Kaul pushes 
forward state’s interests in international relations.  
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As the Security Council members have to cooperate in order to prosecute 
crime of aggression violators, this has resulted additional limitation to the ICC 
function to execute the crime of aggression sentencing. As a hypothesis, if the ICC 
cannot proceed with a case due to the absence of a Security Council’s determinations, 
this leads to the conclusion where the ICC’s powers to prosecute the violators of the 
crime of aggression is blocked due to the disagreement among the Security Council 
members307. This is especially evident in the Global War on Terror conflict, where the 
members of the Security Council differ in their support of different oppositional 
parties to the conflict – Russia backing the Assad-regime, while the West (the US, the 
UK, etc.) reinforce the Syrian opposition or the moderate opposition (the anti-
Syrian/Assad government). If the ICC’s function to prosecute the crime of aggression 
is blocked due to the differing positions to conflicts, it can be argued that it is due to 
the manifestation of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics in the existing 
disputes, which create incomprehension in reaching mutual agreement in upholding 
values that would sustain security, order and peace in international affairs. One could 
argue that, the politicization of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other indeed continues 
to persist in international relations. As a result, the UK delegation pointed out at the 
Conference that there is a need for “mutual reinforcing relationship between the 
Council and the Court”308, in order to prevent grave crimes – crime of aggression – 
from manifesting in the international community, which would entail of 
‘depoliticization’ of international relations and forge unilateral values that are upheld 










Another concern regarding the new Article 8 bis was its definitional formulation in 
paragraph 2, which is in conformity with the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) – “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against 
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the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in 
this Definition”309. The majority of the delegations – France, the UK, the US, Cuba, 
Belgium, Norway, Japan, Brazil, etc. – reiterated an opinion that the achieved 
definition of the crime of aggression renders a generic formulation310. According to 
the UK, the US, France, Belgium, Norway, and Brazil the generic formulation – also 
referred as broad interpretation or definition – was an appropriate solution for 
adopting a definitional interpretation for the crime of aggression, as France declared 
that it “welcomes the spirit of consensus that prevailed during the proceedings which 
led to the adoption of the resolution amending article 8 of the Rome Statute”311. 
According to Hoffman, broad interpretation engages with the interpretation of the 
meaning of the contract as a whole, which includes filling gaps in an incomplete text 
and extending the concept to apply to policies dealing with the restriction or 
disposition of new development, which may lead to an ambiguous outcome312. Using 
Luban’s analogy of politicization313, a broad definition tends to create a ‘loop hole’ 
making its scope to exclude acts that fall outside the insufficient gravity. However, 
the gaps created by the definitional formulation can also include acts that fall within 
the sufficient gravity depending on the politicization of the case and the stakes that 
are at place. Thus, both processes of exclusion and inclusion allow process of the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politicization to manifest through these ‘loop holes’, 
which become unconstrained due to the possibility for open interpretation in order to 
fill in the gaps within the legal definition314. 
This issue was addressed by the Cuban delegation. It expressed a viewpoint on 
the scope of the crime of aggression that the broader interpretation will exclude such 
cases that are insufficient in gravity and falling within the grey area315 that it is “not 
limited solely to the use of armed force by a State, leaving aside other forms of 
aggression that may also violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity [and/]or political 
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independence of another States” (United Nations Charter Article 2(4))316. As a result, 
there is a danger that the newly adopted juristic order under the Article 8 bis(2) will 
not stop the manifestation of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics, but instead 
allows it to flourish by creating a new situation of exception. One could argue, that 
the adopted broad definition of the crime of aggression reflects a political agenda of 
the minority of the powerful delegations at the Kampala Conference, as the Iranian 
delegation posted that the “whole raft of proposals which were not very transparent, 
generally one-sided and showed little regard for the concerns of the majority”317. 
Consequently, this manifests violence between different parties to the conflict, as each 
party believes that it is in their interest. Consequently, the ‘gaps’ within the broad 
definition will allow dismissing facts that continue the revelation of the Friend/Self 
and the Enemy/Other politics. 
Consequently, other delegations expressed one way or another their 
disappointment with the adopted definitional formulation of the crime of aggression, 
as in their opinion – Iran, Israel, Russia, China, Japan, Cuba, etc. – stronger and 
narrower interpretation of the crime of aggression would make more justice in 
relation to the criminal responsibility318. At the same time it would also restrain the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics in the international affairs, which tends to 
steer conflicts in the 21st century, such as the Global War on Terror, which was 
precipitated by the occurrence of the 9/11-incident. While the Iranian delegation 
insisted on the formulation of the crime of aggression as an “act by necessity serious” 
recalling the two exceptions in UNC Art2(4) rather than “the most serious and 
dangerous for of illegal use of force” by linking it to the United Nations Charter319. 
Both Iranian and Libyan delegations viewed that the crime of aggression should be 
criminalized and that Article 8 bis(2) needed further specification of restrictions and 
conditions of the state act of aggression as: “such as, in particular, a war of aggression 
or an act which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or 
annexing the territory of another state or part thereof” as well as inclusion of 
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confiscation of property and the establishment of settlements in occupied 
territories320.  
By having a stronger and narrower definitional formulation would provide 
firmer structural amendment to the Rome Statute, as narrow definition would define 
the exact processes for which the criminal responsibility will be subjected. According 
to Kenneth Waltz, it would limit power politics of the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other conducted by the powerful states, which appears to be the minority as 
well. One could argue, that the ‘vicious cycle’ has prevailed in the newly adopted 
crime of aggression definition since the Nuremberg Tribunal when the Allied Powers 
seized the “prosecutor, judge and executioner”321 power allowing the powerful states 
to apply their political agenda in conflicts in order to achieve their political goals, i.e. 
interests. This is evident in the broad definition adopted in the Article 8 bis(2) 
allowing gaps of the textual interpretation to prevail, thus enabling process of the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politicization of the legal doctrines to take place. 
This has led to what offensive realists, John Mearsheimer, argues of maintaining legal 
system structure that encourages states to maximize their share of world power 
through legal means322. This intensifies the security competition between the states 
where contrasting values collide generating a conflict that bears dichotomous nature 
by juxtaposing two different polarities.  
At the same time a political agenda becomes manipulated as these different 
polarities stress opposing cultural and identity differences that persist within these 
nation-states323. In the Kampala Conference, it seemed that the powerful minority 
apprehended the majority by penetrating the legal agenda with the political underlying 
causes. For instance, an interest in continuation of waging global conflict in 
persuasion of state’s objectives. This is evident in the case of the Global War on 
Terror as certain states – mainly the US who declared the Global War on Terror after 
the 9/11 attack by accusing Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction, which 
eventually turned out to be a false call – are bound with interest in search of natural 
resources – oil – in order to reinforce ones hegemonic power hold and economic 
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performance324. Furthermore, by enshrining power politics into the legal text will 
define the sovereign in the international affairs as he who is eligible to use coercive 
methods of the use of force to maintain peace, order, and security (UN Charter Article 
1) in the name of humanity325. The disagreement on how the power politics should be 
divided in the international system was evident as how the powerful minority 
apprehended the majority in how the crime of aggression definition should be 
formulated and adopted.  
As the new definitional formulation of the crime of aggression leaves a gap for 
the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politicization, thus Russia has expressed its 
disappointment with the consensus as it did not reflect the “full extent the existing 
system of maintenance of peace and security healed by the Security Council and first 
of all in the sphere of the Security Council prerogatives in defining the existence of an 
act of aggression”326. Instead, as Israel noted, it yielded “ambiguity and lack of 
sufficient legal clarity surrounding the interpretation of certain terms”327. This tends 
to question the role of power politics intertwined within the legal grounds of newly 
formulated term of the crime of aggression. This tends to indicate that the legal 
doctrine is “one-sided and [that it] showed little regard for the concerns of the 
majority” as the Iranian delegation pointed out at the Conference328. This seeming to 
suggest that not only was the end result of Artcile 8 bis adaptation politicized, but the 
entire Conference procedure was where delegations grouped – i.e. formed an alliance 
– according to their interests and values that each groups of states upheld. This 
resembled the Versailles Conference 1919 where nation-states were grouped in 
alliance systems – the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers. However, in the Kampala 
Conference the nation-states were divided into the ‘Western side’ (US, UK, France, 
Norway, etc.) and the ‘Eastern side’ (Russia, Iran, China, Israel, etc.).  
It can be argued that this divisional politicization of the Article 8 bis(2) is due 
to the disagreement on values and interests that the states share. The Article 8 bis was 
adopted in the 21st century where the most values and interests are shaped by the 
contemporary dispute – the Global War on Terror, which can also be referred as a 
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regional ‘proxy war’ carried out by powerful states. It can be noted that this conflict 
has had its impact on formulating the Article 8 bis(2) definition. The Article can be 
found to be very broad in its interpretation leaving out acts of insufficient gravity 
from being prosecuted. However, narrowing it down to specific use of force acts 
would condemn the manifestation of crime of aggression and violation of sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity (United Nations Charter Article 2(4)) as 
mentioned by the Iranian delegations329. Instead, the Article 8 bis(2) mentions “means 
the use of force by a State” in generic terms. Though this formulation is followed by a 
list of acts in sub-paragraphs (a)-(g) that are qualified according to the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) as acts of aggression. However, these 
deeds are linked to a state actions, not individual conduct as pointed out in the Article 
8 bis(1), which also sets the threshold clause. It is possible to state that these two 







ARTICLE 8 BIS(1) – THRESHOLD CLAUSE  
 
 
In the Kampala Conference, delegations from the member states of the ICC were 
gathered to negotiate on the formulation of the crime of aggression. The definition of 
the crime of aggression was reached at the Conference by including it in the Article 8 
bis(2):  
 
“For the purpose of the paragraph 1, ‘act of aggression’ means the use of 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations”330.  
 
However, the Article 8 bis(2) should be read in conjunction with the threshold clause, 
which was worded in the Article 8 bis(1):  
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“’For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of 
an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”331. 
 
The paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Article 8 bis cannot be read separately; they 
have to be read together as they fully contextualise the adopted crime of aggression 
definition. Due to the broad definitional formulation in the Article 8 bis(2) the 
threshold clause in the Article 8 bis(1) also becomes broad in its interpretation as 
noted by the Israeli delegation: “Among other things, we remain concerned of the 
ambiguity and lack of sufficient legal capacity surrounding the interpretation of 
certain terms”332. Leading to an issue of ambiguity in the application of the threshold 
clause as Cuban delegation expressed that the scope of the crime of aggression in 
paragraph (2) holds a broad interpretation that will thus exclude such acts that are 
insufficient in gravity and those that fall within the grey area333. This further 
politicizes the newly adopted Article 8 bis allowing the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other to manifest within the crime of aggression in grey areas as the 
proportionality criteria of character, gravity and scale was unclearly set in relation to 
the state act of crime of aggression in paragraph (2). The ambiguity in the legal 
doctrine, i.e. the grey area, surrounding the threshold clause allows the political 
agenda of powerful states to manoeuvre disputes in the name of humanity, at the same 
time conceal a factor behind contemporary conflicts – an interest334. One could argue, 
that the legal doctrine of threshold clause creates ‘deception’ allowing states driven 
with interests to obtain their political objective, e.g. in the case of Iraqi invasion for 
search of weapons of mass destruction, which did not after all exist there, instead the 
Iraqi invasion coalition bared in mind the oil resources allocated in the region.  
However, a problem persists within these newly adopted paragraphs (1) and 
(2) in Article 8 bis. As much as they have to be read in conjunction, as noted in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331	  ICC-­‐ASP/6/20/Add.1,	  2010:	  12	  
332	  International	  Criminal	  Court,	  2010:	  126	  
333	  ICC-­‐ASP/6/20/Add.1,	  2010:	  4	  
334	  Kaul,	  2011:	  2;	  Luban,	  2011:	  7	  
	  
71	  
paragraph (2) – “For the purpose of paragraph 1”, at the same time they cannot be. 
This is due to the fact that the paragraph (1) taken together with draft Article 25 
bis(3). The draft Article 25 bis(3) ensures the leadership requirement would not only 
be applied to the principal penetrator, but to all forms of participation by an individual 
responsible for the crime of aggression335. As a result, Article 8 bis(1) reflects the 
progress made thus far on the definition of the individual’s conduct of the crime of 
aggression336  – “crime of aggression means …, by a person in a position effectively 
to exercise control”. While paragraph (2) of Article 8 bis links act of aggression to a 
State – “act of aggression means the use of armed force by a State”337. In other words, 
paragraph (1) of Article 8 bis reflects individual responsibility, while paragraph (2) 
prescribes the state responsibility. This leads to a hypothesis that these paragraphs are 
not compatible with their responsibility purposes, thus the Friend/Self and 
Enemy/Other politicization continues within these responsibility clauses. Arguably 
this can be linked to what Schmitt notes that the political concept of the Friend/Self 
and the Enemy/Other can only focus on one specific conflict/responsibility at a time, 
thus being bound to a concrete situation/clause338. This connects the specific type of 
conflict scenario with the specific type of responsibility.  
As a result, this has led to further complications of the threshold clause. As 
threshold clause is only outlined in the paragraph (1) of Article 8 bis, thus the 
threshold clause becomes linked to an individual responsibility and not to state 
responsibility. Though paragraph (2) refers to paragraph (1), yet they act 
independently. As a threshold clause is tied up to a specific type of responsibility, it 
can be argued, that the threshold clause becomes unevenly applied. Due to 
asymmetrical application of threshold cause it becomes easily intertwined with the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics. This creates a scenario where violence is 
unequally distributed by creating two different scenes of the state of exception. The 
first state of exception in relation to the individual responsibility and the threshold, 
which is dependent on “person[’s] effective exercise [of] control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State… its character, gravity and scale…”, and the 
second where the state of exception is linked to the state responsibility and the acts 
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that are enlisted in sub-paragraphs (a)-(g), which are in accordance with the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX).  
As two different jurisdictional the state of exception orders are set, which are 
governed with two different legal orders, thus two different political categories are 
establish as well. These groups, according to Schmitt, came to be based on a 
particular identity that serves as the substance of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other 
distinction. Such an identity must differ from the identity of any other political 
community for the group in question to achieve a political identity of its own339. In 
this case, the two different identity categories are the individual responsibility 
outlined in paragraph (1) and the state responsibility in paragraph (2). This will also 
entail that one takes the view that a war is legitimate on one side, while illegitimate 
for the other; creating an anomie340. Two scenarios of the state of exception are 
produced where an individual can be labelled as a legal exception and thus be 
prosecuted under the Article 8 bis(1), or the state of exception where the state 
becomes categorized as the legal exception under the Article 8 bis(2).  
Even though the paragraph (2) definition of the act of aggression is linked to a 
state conduct, but it does not contain a threshold clause as such. Paragraph (2) does 
enlist acts of aggression in its sub-paragraphs (a)-(g), which could be associated to set 
up a threshold for the state responsibility, but the threshold as such is not directly 
outlined in the paragraph (2), compared to paragraph (1) – “character, gravity and 
scale”341. The state act of crime of aggression, becomes open-ended as the threshold 
clause is missing, and instead it becomes hard to evaluate the level of ‘character, 
gravity and scale’ of these deeds. This is due to the threshold clause being left out 
from paragraph (2), and instead linked to the individual conduct. A state remains in 
the sphere of legal norm, while the individual can be removed from the legal norm 
into legal exception category, thus the state remains unquestionably the force that 
upholds the survival of the nation-state and legitimate power to secure its position in 
the global arena against the Enemy/Other that threatens its ‘way of life’. 
Even though these paragraphs can be read in conjunction, as the paragraph (2) 
refers to paragraph (1) – “For the purpose of paragraph 1”342, i.e. supporting it. Yet, 
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the support is accentuated at the individual responsibility. One could argue, that if the 
purpose of the Kampala Conference was to criminalize state’s act of crime of 
aggression, it would probably be outlined in the paragraph (1). Hereby, these 
paragraphs would be in reverse order. Causing any person in change who acts on 
behalf of a state to be linked to a state, and consequently, a state becomes responsible 
for the crime of aggression as the leaders represent the state. Instead, the current 
adopted formulation still ends up putting all the responsibility on individual who is 
exercising control (Article 8 bis(1))343. A state responsibility without a threshold 
clause leaves the state within the legal norm, while the individual who operates 
“behind the curtains” on behalf of the state is prosecuted for the crime of 
aggression344. 
As a result, this has led to a development of new circumstances where the new 
‘police system’ through Article 8 bis amendments aims to gain a new approach to the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other power politics345. It can be argued that the ‘police 
system’ attempts to be achieved through a new legitimate international order, which is 
imposed ‘by force’ by the minority at the Kampala Conference, while the majority 
expressed its disappointment with the adopted Article 8 bis formulation, as the 
formulation of the Article 8 bis remains open-ended in its definition and in its 
threshold clause as well. As argued by Schmitt, in order to uphold plural international 
order, there is a need for transference of jus belli into alliance system346. In this case it 
will redirect the dichotomous sense of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other from 
forming independent coalitions of individual states into communal political 
community – alliance system – where the use of force will be exercised by the 
‘alliance’ system – the Security Council. In which case a new state of exception of the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics is established, which was legitimized 
through amendment formulation. Therefore, the majority of the delegations were 
disappointed with the amendment results to the Rome Statute in the 2010 Kampala 
Conference as it did adopt a state act of crime of aggression definition, but as it 
remained generic so did the threshold clause appear open-ended as well as its 
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responsibility was diverted at the individual level, rather than condemning state actors 





















































According to an observer of the criminalization of aggression, Judge Dr. Kaul, today 
world’s reality seems quite obvious that certain states – especially the powerful ones – 
continue to reserve the natural/inherent right to make war/conflict, openly and/or 
discreetly347. He suggests that there is an interest behind waging war/conflict that is 
politically driven348. Similar view was shared by two famous lawyers. A British 
alternative judge at the Nuremberg Tribunal, Sir Norman Birkett, saw the political 
justice being pursued in the Nuremberg Trials (20th November 1945 – 31st August 
1946) where “the trial [was] only in form a judicial process[, which] main importance 
[was] political” 349. Further reaffirmation of this point was presented by the chief US 
prosecutor and a former US Attorney General, Robert Jackson. He noted that the 
Nuremberg trials were indeed a “continuation of the war effort of the Allied nations” 
against Germany350. These judicial observations pursued for political purposes echo 
Clausewitzian dictum on ‘war[/conflict] is politics by other means’. Subsequently, 
Clausewitzian dictum could be revered to argue that ‘law operates as war tool seeking 
political ends’ both the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and the 2010 
Kampala Conference. Hereby, suggesting that political agenda is intertwined with 
legal framework.  
The outcome of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg was the 
creation of an unequal perception of the international actors in the international 
system. This was possible to achieve only by “recogniz[ing enemy] as the enemy” 351, 
which promoted the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other political framework into the 
international criminal legal system. As a result, the Allied Powers were recognized as 
the Friend/Self. They served justice by advancing morality, and at the same time 
upholding security, peace, and order principles in the name of humanity in the global 
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affairs352. On the contrary, the Enemy/Other was perceived as evil, i.e. immoral, who 
spread death, violence, and brutality resulting in the ‘collective trauma’ and 
‘collective anxiety’353. The victorious Allied Powers seized the sovereign power by 
establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal on 20th November 1945. It gave them the ability 
to decide on the exception, and thus being entitled to apply means of coercion and use 
of force in order to uphold the international principles of the peace, order, and 
security in the name of the humanity354. This advanced the sense of morality within 
the international system through the Charter and judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, based on which the prosecution of the Nazi leaders and their associates was 
held. At this point of history, the sovereignty of the Allied Powers was fortified 
positioning them as unilateral and an extra juridical body giving them immunity 
against to be prosecuted their own legal doctrine. This entailed that they belonged to 
the legal norm, which was at that point of history the right choice to promote peace, 
order, and security in the international system that enabled them to be classified as the 
Friend/Self. 
The newly adopted amendment(s) – Article 8 bis – in the 2010 Kampala 
Conference translated the natural/inherent sovereign power of the powerful states to 
the Security Council where the member states would need to collaborate to forge 
unilateral decisions. Majority of the delegations viewed this to be incompatible with 
the United Nations Charter – self-defence clause and Chapter IV. Firstly, it translated 
the natural/inherent sovereign power of the powerful states to determine on the 
existence of the crime of aggression to the member states of the Security Council, in 
order to preserve peace, order, and security (UN Charter Article 1)355. Secondly, it 
gave the Security Council the sovereign power to determine the existence of the crime 
of aggression before the ICC could exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. This would result in continuation of committing the crime of aggression 
by the powerful states in the international system, while consensus on the culprit 
would be pending. Consequently, the culprit would never end up being prosecuted by 
the ICC, as the Security Council could not reach the consensus on the matter. This is 
due to that fact that each state pursues their own political agenda that differs from 
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other states. As a result, this amendment transferred the jus belli into alliance system 
by taking away the natural/inherent sovereign power of singular states356. Thus, the 
Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics become associated with the Security 
Council as the one that decides on the exception, and the one who structures the legal 
order of the international system. 
A generic formulation was adopted in amended Article 8 bis(2) definition. It 
excluded cases that were insufficient in gravity and that fell within the grey area. 
Consequently, majority of the delegations feared that newly adopted juristic order 
under Article 8 bis(2) would not stop the manifestation of the Friend/Self and the 
Enemy/Other politics within the legal framework, and instead would nurture a new 
situation of exception in the 21st century357. This concern was outlined by the Iranian 
delegation posing that the “whole raft of proposals which were not very transparent, 
generally one-sided[;] showed little regard for the concerns of the majority”358. 
Leading to unequal and discriminatory treatment of states within the international 
system where the sovereign Friend/Self decides on the exception, in this case the 
minority of the powerful states. As a result, the generic definition of the crime of 
aggression in Article 8 bis(2) reflects a political agenda of the powerful minority 
delegations at the Kampala Conference, as it allows to dismiss the facts that are 
relevant for the continue of the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other politics.  
Furthermore, the threshold clause of the crime of aggression is indicated in the 
Article 8 bis(1).  It is linked to an individual responsibility, rather than to the state 
responsibility that is outline in paragraph (2). This boomeranged the full purpose of 
the 2010 Kampala Conference. Its aim was to criminalise the state act of crime of 
aggression; instead it diverted back to the individual responsibility from paragraph (2) 
to paragraph (1), as it used to be criminalised in the International Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg. Although paragraph (2) enlists deeds that are regarded as state crime of 
aggression, but the paragraph itself does not contain a threshold clause. Instead, the 
broad formulation of paragraph (2) has to be read as the threshold clause as well, 
which leaves grey areas for interpretation of facts that are insufficient in their gravity. 
Thus, a state responsibility without a proper threshold clause leaves the state within 
the legal norm, while the individual who operates on behalf of the state is prosecuted 
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for the crime of aggression. This has allowed the continuation of the Friend/Self and 
the Enemy/Other politics to be conducted by the powerful states, while the 
disagreement within the Security Council has blocked the cases of the crime of 
aggression to be referred to the ICC. 
To conclude, the political objectives sought by the powerful states installed 
the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other dichotomous framework, as species of politics, 
into the legal doctrine of the crime of aggression. This action would legalise the use 
of force conducted by the Friend/Self, and outlawing any violence from the 
Enemy/Other. This tends to collide different political communities where 
participating parties are inherently unequal359. Hereby, one could argue, that the aim 
of the historical development of the crime of aggression was not to neutralize the 
political arena where political actors would be equal. In order to prevent this from 
happening reversing the paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 8 bis would serve more 
justice making states responsible for the crime of aggression, because the political 
leaders act on behalf and represent the state. Otherwise, power politics will prevail 
and even deepen the escalation of violence, i.e. crime of aggression, through legal 
means. In which case the Friend/Self and the Enemy/Other dichotomous politics will 
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